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SPILL YOUR (TRADE) SECRETS: KNOWLEDGE
NETWORKS AS INNOVATION DRIVERS
Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña*
ABSTRACT
Theories of intellectual property take the individual inventor or the firm as the unit of
innovation. But studies in economic sociology show that in complex fields where knowledge is
rapidly advancing and widely dispersed among different firms, the locus of innovation is neither
an individual nor a single firm. Rather, innovative ideas originate in the informal networks of
learning and collaboration that cut across firms.
Understanding innovation in this subset of industries as emerging out of networks of informal information-sharing across firms challenges traditional utilitarian theories of trade secret
law—which assume trade secret protection is needed to prevent excessive private, self-help efforts
to preserve secrecy. Doctrinally, knowledge network research suggests that the scope of trade secret
protection in these industries should be narrow. In these industries, strong trade secret rights that
grant managers tight control over employee-inventors’ informal information-sharing practices are
bad innovation policy. Rather, optimizing trade secret law requires tailoring the strength of
protection to match industry characteristics, narrowing trade secret scope in those industries
where informal information-sharing networks are predicted to enhance innovative output. In
turn, because industry types tend to cluster around geographic centers, the importance of tailoring
cautions against current trends towards uniformity by federalizing trade secret law and favors
state experimentalism in designing trade secret law and policy.
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INTRODUCTION
Where does innovation take place? Under traditional theories of intellectual property, the answer to this question seems rather obvious. Innovation takes place inside individual firms, where inventors and, increasingly,
teams of inventors lead research and development efforts.1 But economic
sociology studies show that in complex fields where knowledge is both rapidly advancing and widely dispersed across firms, the locus of innovation is
no longer a specific firm.2 Rather, innovative ideas often originate in informal networks of learning and collaboration that cut across firms.3 Shifting
the unit of innovation from the firm (or the individual) to the network of
relationships in which these actors are embedded has important consequences for intellectual property theory and practice. This Article focuses on
one such consequence: the implications of informal, cross-firm networks of
innovation for trade secret theory and doctrine, and for the overlap between
state and federal trade secret protection. This Article shows how, in a subset
of science-based industries, where innovation is fast paced and needed knowledge is widely distributed among firms, innovation is likely to proceed more
efficiently when networks of informal know-how sharing are encouraged. In
these industries, strong trade secret rights that grant managers tight control
over employee-inventors’ informal information-sharing practices would be
bad innovation policy. Rather, optimizing trade secret law requires tailoring
the strength of protection to match industry characteristics, narrowing trade
secret scope in those industries where informal information-sharing networks
are predicted to enhance innovative output. In turn, because industry types
tend to cluster around geographic centers, the importance of tailoring cautions against current trends towards uniformity by federalizing trade secret
law and favors state experimentalism in designing trade secret law and policy.
Contrary to traditional assumptions in intellectual property theories, a
large and growing body of historical and empirical work reveals that informal
information-exchange networks across firm boundaries can be crucial to spur
innovation. As historical studies document, in the Industrial Revolution—an
era of technological explosion that many attribute to the increased availabil-

1 See infra Section I.A; see also Stefan Wuchty et al., The Increasing Dominance of Teams
in Production of Knowledge, 316 SCI. 1036, 1036–39 (2007) (emphasizing the rise of teams in
modern-day innovation).
2 See infra Sections I.B, I.C; see also Naomi R. Lamoreaux et al., Beyond Markets and
Hierarchies: Toward a New Synthesis of American Business History, 108 AM. HIST. REV. 404
(2003); Walter W. Powell, Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization, in 12
RES. IN ORG. BEHAV. 295, 308–09 (1990); Walter W. Powell et al., Interorganizational Collaboration and the Locus of Innovation: Networks of Learning in Biotechnology, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 116
(1996); Walter Powell & Eric Giannella, Collective Invention and Inventor Networks, in HANDBOOK ECON. INNOVATION (Bronwyn Hall & Nathan Rosenberg eds., 2009).
3 Powell, supra note 2, at 295; see also Laura Pedraza-Fariña, The Social Origins of Innovation Failures, 70 SMU L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
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ity of intellectual property protection4—a subset of industries made breakthrough advances precisely by eschewing trade secret protection.5 Instead, in
these industries, including fundamental steam engine technology, engineers
who worked for competing firms but belonged to the same epistemic community6 freely and reciprocally shared know-how across firm boundaries.7
More recently, empirical studies in the biotechnology, semiconductors, and
information technology industries reveal a similar trend: important modern
discoveries were enabled by informal networks of information-sharing across
competing firms.8
4 See, e.g., Joel Mokyr, Intellectual Property Rights, the Industrial Revolution, and the Beginnings of Modern Economic Growth, 99 AM. ECON. REV., no. 2, 2009, at 349, 352.
5 See infra Section I.B; see also JOEL MOKYR, A CULTURE OF GROWTH (2016) (arguing
that a culture of open sharing that was prevalent among the European scientific community—but absent in China—explains why the Industrial Revolution began and flourished
in the West); Robert C. Allen, Collective Invention, 4 J. ECON. BEHAV. AND ORG. 1 (1983);
Alessandro Nuvolari, Collective Invention During the British Industrial Revolution: The Case of the
Cornish Pumping Engine, 28 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 347 (2004); Eric von Hippel, Cooperation
Between Rivals: Informal Know-How Trading, 16 RES. POL. 291 (1987); Eric von Hippel &
Georg von Krogh, Open Innovation and the Private-Collective Model for Innovation Incentives, in
THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH
(Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg, eds. 2011).
6 I adopt Peter Haas’s definition of epistemic community: “a network of professionals
with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative
claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.” Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 3 (1992).
Epistemic communities are also sociological groups that share a common culture or “common style of thinking.” Id. at 3 n.4; see also Laura Pedraza-Fariña, Patent Law and the Sociology of Innovation, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 813, 838–40 (describing sociological and historical
analyses of scientific communities, including different terminologies used to describe scientific groups with a common set of social ties and expert knowledge bases). The existence of an epistemic community with a common set of social norms enables the
emergence of information-sharing networks.
7 See Allen, supra note 5; Nuvolari, supra note 5. Firms can also exchange information
through other, more formal means, such as agreements to license or sell proprietary knowhow and agreements to perform R&D cooperatively. These types of exchanges have been
more widely studied (in particular in the management literature) than the informal informational exchanges addressed in this Article. See, e.g., René Belderbos, Martin Carree &
Boris Lokshin, Cooperative R&D and Firm Performance, 33 RES. POL. 1477 (2004); John
Hagedoorn, Inter-firm R&D Partnerships: An Overview of Major Trends and Patterns Since 1960,
31 RES. POL. 477 (2002); John Hagedoorn, Albert N. Link & Nicholas S. Vonortas, Research
Partnerships, 29 RES. POL. 567 (2000).
8 See, e.g., David P. Angel, The Labor Market for Engineers in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 65 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 99 (1989); Michael Slavensky Dahl & Christian Ø.R. Pedersen,
Knowledge Flows Through Informal Contacts in Industrial Clusters: Myth or Reality?, 33 RES. POL.
1673 (2004); Lee Fleming & Koen Frenken, The Evolution of Inventor Networks in the Silicon
Valley and Boston Regions, 10 ADVANCES COMPLEX SYS. 53 (2007); Michelle Gittelman, Does
Geography Matter for Science-Based Firms? Epistemic Communities and the Geography of Research
and Patenting in Biotechnology, 18 ORG. SCI. 724 (2007); Kelley Porter, Kjersten Bunker Whittington & Walter W. Powell, The Institutional Embeddedness of High-Tech Regions: Relational
Foundations of the Boston Biotechnology Community, in CLUSTERS, NETWORKS, AND INNOVATION
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The prevalence of these informal information exchanges challenges
three long-standing assumptions in traditional utilitarian theories of trade
secret law. First, utilitarian theories predict that, absent trade secret protection, firms will overinvest in self-help measures to preserve secrecy.9 Second,
lack of trade secret protection is predicted to fragment scientific and technological research by incentivizing firms to only selectively disclose information
to employees, thus hampering internal collaboration.10 Third, absent protections against misappropriation provided by trade secret law, firms are predicted to underinvest in employee training.11
Why does traditional utilitarian theory get firm behavior wrong?
Because it fails to realize that there is a second possible response to low trade
secret protection. Knowledge network research tells us that, when it is hard
to keep information secret, some industries will build reciprocal informationsharing innovation networks—rather than higher walls to protect their
secrets.12 When innovation networks form, the precise opposite of knowledge fragmentation takes place: informal interactions within and across firms
incentivize knowledge recombination and synthesis, often leading to breakthrough innovation.13 Employee learning also grows exponentially at networks through exposure to ideas from multiple institutional cultures.14
What are the implications of knowledge network studies for trade secret
doctrine?15 Applying knowledge network studies to trade secret law suggests
two conditions where low trade secret protection is more likely to lead to
(Stefano Breschi & Franco Malerba eds., 2005); Powell et al., supra note 2; Powell & Giannella, supra note 2; Walter Powell, Kelley Packalen & Kjersten Whittington, Organizational
and Institutional Genesis: The Emergence of High-Tech Clusters in the Life Sciences, in THE EMERGENCE OF ORGANIZATIONS AND MARKETS (Padgett & Powell eds., 2012); Everett M. Rogers,
Information Exchange and Technological Innovation, in THE TRANSFER AND UTILIZATION OF
TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE 105 (Devendra Sahal ed., 1982); Stephan Schrader, Informal Technology Transfer Between Firms: Co-Operation Through Information Trading, 20 RES. POL. 153
(1991); Lauren Smith-Doerr & Walter Powell, Networks and Economic Life, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY (2003).
9 See infra Section II.A.
10 See infra Section II.A.
11 See infra Section II.A.
12 See infra Section I.B (summarizing historical studies); Section I.C (summarizing
empirical studies of modern innovation).
13 See infra Section II.B.
14 See infra Section II.B.
15 One key objection to the proposals advanced in this Article can be framed as follows: Why, if informal information-sharing is, overall, beneficial to firm performance, don’t
firms simply encourage informal information-sharing networks? Why does trade secret law
matter at all in these industries? The answer to this question is two-fold. First, firms suffer
from well-understood collective action problems: although it would be in the collective
interest of all firms in the region to facilitate informal information-sharing, any given firm
would prefer to receive information but keep internally-produced information secret. Second, as this Article discusses in Section II.B, managers’ and inventors’ background norms
and incentives conflict. From the perspective of overall social welfare, however, there is
mounting empirical evidence that in these fields, public welfare is better aligned with
inventors’ incentives than with those of managers.
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local, open information sharing than to excessive efforts at secrecy: (1) complex innovation (where technological progress is rapid and knowledge is
widely dispersed among firms);16 and (2) a background, local epistemic community with social norms of open-sharing (often affiliated with a university
that anchors a technology cluster).17 When these two conditions are fulfilled, this Article argues, courts should interpret trade secret law narrowly by
(1) expanding the scope of what constitutes general technical knowledge
that is ineligible for trade secret protection (for example, by excluding technical negative know-how18 from the scope of trade secret protection); (2)
defining an employee’s implied duty of loyalty narrowly, absent an express
contract provision; and (3) refusing to apply the “inevitable disclosure doctrine” absent a showing of bad faith on the part of the employee.19
Further, the geographic clustering of complex innovation industries by
state,20 and the importance of fostering local information exchange to form
successful clusters, argues for a robust role for states in designing specific
trade secret laws to fit the needs of their particular local state industries. In
turn, the local and contextual impact of trade secret law on innovation highlights the importance of policing the overlap between the newly created federal cause of action for trade secret misappropriation (the Defend Trade
Secrets Act)21 and state trade secret law—lest the ability of states to tailor
trade secret doctrine get swept away by the drive for uniformity.
The idea that innovation can take place in networks is, of course, not
new. Studies on the role of networks in innovation (and related studies on
innovation clusters) stretch back to the 1980s in management, sociological,
and economics literature.22 In law, scholars such as Yochai Benkler and Julie
Cohen have focused on the importance of networks for the social, non-market production of knowledge.23 Additionally, both business and legal scholars have written extensively about the rise of “open innovation” and “user
16 See infra Sections I.B, I.C.
17 See infra Sections I.B, I.C.
18 Negative know-how refers to information about “blind alleys” or failed experiments.
Charles Tait Graves, The Law of Negative Knowledge: A Critique, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
387, 410 (2007).
19 See infra subsection III.A.3.
20 Industries that are both complex and anchored to an epistemic network of inventors often locate at geographic “centers.” For example, Boston, San Diego, and Silicon
Valley have a high density of biotechnology and IT companies. This suggests that tailoring
can take place through state-by-state variation of trade secret law to fit local state industry
profiles. See infra Section III.B.
21 Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
22 See, e.g., Ronald S. Burt, Innovation as a Structural Interest: Rethinking the Impact of
Network Position on Innovation Adoption, 2 SOC. NETWORKS 327 (1980); J. Carlos Jarillo, On
Strategic Networks, 9 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 31 (1988); Michael L. Tushman & Richard R. Nelson, Introduction: Technology, Organizations and Innovation, 35 ADMIN. SCI. QUART. 1 (1990).
23 See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006); JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED
SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE (2012); see also generally Pedraza-
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innovation” models—two ideas that are related to the concept of networks.24
A growing literature in contract law also focuses on formal and informal
arrangements among firms that enable collaborative research.25 This literature pays close attention to informal norms that facilitate dealings between
firms, but the emphasis in this line of scholarship is on the creation of informal bonds of trust through formal contractual mechanisms and on the informal enforcement of these formal contractual promises. The literature on
informal exchanges of know-how through epistemic community networks
remains thin.26 Finally, employment and intellectual property scholars have
focused on the importance of employee migration for innovation in highvelocity industries in the context of intellectual property and contractual policies that can curtail such migration.27
Fariña, supra note 3 (analyzing social barriers to the productive flow and recombination of
ideas).
24 See, e.g., Carliss Baldwin & Eric von Hippel, Modeling a Paradigm Shift: From Producer
Innovation to User and Open Collaborative Innovation, 22 ORG. SCI. 1399 (2011); Gaia Bernstein, Incentivizing the Ordinary User, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1275 (2015); Gaia Bernstein, The End
User’s Predicament: User Standing in Patent Litigation, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1929 (2016); Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of the End User in Patent Litigation, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1443 (2014); Julie E.
Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347 (2005); Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP? Accommodating Intellectual Production Outside the Intellectual
Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1437 (2010); William W. Fisher III, The Implications
for Law of User Innovation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1417 (2010); Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as
Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467 (2008); Joel West &
Marcel Bogers, Leveraging External Sources of Innovation: A Review of Research on Open Innovation, 31 J. PRODUCT INNOVATION MGMT. 814 (2013). The concept of open innovation is
often linked with the Open Source movement in software development, which is one of
the most visible examples of open innovation’s successes. Indeed, the informal information-sharing networks in Silicon Valley described in this Article overlap with the networks
of software engineers that facilitated the Open Source movement’s emergence. See, e.g., E.
GABRIELLA COLEMAN, CODING FREEDOM: THE ETHICS AND AESTHETICS OF HACKING (2013);
JOSH LERNER & MARK SCHANKERMAN, THE COMINGLED CODE (2010); Michael J. Madison,
Open Secrets, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY
RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 222 (arguing that trade secret law can serve a structural function
in managing—and preserving—protected knowledge commons); Geertrui Van Overwalle,
Uncorking Trade Secrets: Sparking the Interaction Between Trade Secrecy and Open Biotechnology, in
THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH, supra
note 5, at 246.
25 See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield & Iva Bozovic, Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts to Support Informal Relations in Support of Innovation, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 981; Ronald J. Gilson,
Locating Innovation: The Endogeneity of Technology, Organizational Structure, and Financial Contracting, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 885 (2010); Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E.
Scott, Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM.
L. REV. 431 (2009); Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The
Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 1377 (2010).
26 See supra note 25.
27 See, e.g., ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSES OF
A HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET (2003); ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE
SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE LEAKS, RAIDS, AND FREE-RIDING (2013); Catherine L. Fisk, Working
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This Article adds to this vast, yet incomplete, literature a focus on the
importance of informal information-sharing networks for innovative output
in a subset of industries. This Article also updates current understandings of
the role of informal networks in the legal literature by incorporating
research from sociology and economics that seeks to identify which types of
industries are likely to benefit from informal information-sharing through networks. Finally, this Article emphasizes a little-discussed phenomenon with
important consequences for the design of trade secret law: the conflict
between managers’ and inventors’ practices and background norms towards
know-how sharing.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I demonstrates
the prevalence and the primacy of knowledge networks in historical and
modern incidences of innovation. Part II applies insights about the pro-innovation effects of knowledge networks on trade secret theory. Part III turns
from theory to doctrine, and begins to explore how states can tailor trade
secret doctrine to support the emergence of informal information exchanges
in this subset of industries.
I.
A.

KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS

AS

INNOVATION DRIVERS

The Traditional View: Firms and Individuals as Innovators

Building upon Ronald Coase’s foundational article The Nature of the
Firm,28 scholars have studied the dynamics of innovation by focusing on the
firm (and its decision to “make or buy” an innovation) as the appropriate
unit of analysis.29 Firms will “make” an innovation in-house when the transaction costs of buying the innovation in the market are prohibitively high.30
Knowledge: Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in Employment, and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual
Property, 1800–1920, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 441 (2001); Catherine Fisk, Workplace Knowledge and
the Mobile Employee, in BUSINESS INNOVATION: A LEGAL BALANCING ACT (Marilyn Pittard et al.
eds., 2013); Catherine Fisk & Adam Barry, Contingent Loyalty and Restricted Exit: Commentary
on the Restatement of Employment Law, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 413 (2012); Ronald J.
Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128,
and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999); Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive
Property: Human Capital Law and the Reach of Intellectual Property, 93 TEX. L. REV. 789 (2015).
28 R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
29 See, e.g., Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473
(2005); Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1477 (2005); Laura Poppo & Todd Zenger, Testing Alternative Theories of the Firm: Transaction Cost, Knowledge-Based, and Measurement Explanations for Make-or-Buy Decisions in Information Services, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 853 (1998); Gordon Walker & David Weber, A
Transaction Cost Approach to Make-or-Buy Decisions, 29 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 373 (1984); Oliver E.
Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach, 87 AM. J. SOC. 548
(1981).
30 See ALFRED CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977). Chandler ascribed the superiority of U.S. firms in the twentieth century to their vertically integrated organizational structure. See id. According to
Chandler, the “visible hand” of management provided a superior coordination mechanism
to the “invisible hand” of the market. Id. This view has subsequently been challenged by
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Conversely, firms will “buy” an innovation in the market when the transaction
costs are lower than in-house production costs.31 Hierarchical firms exist, as
Coase postulated, because some production functions are more efficiently
performed under the direct command and control of a single entity than
through market coordination.32 In sum, the “make or buy” decision
depends on comparing the transaction costs of each option.33
Viewing innovation from the perspective of a firm’s decision to “make or
buy” has led several law and economics scholars and property theorists to
focus on the impact of intellectual property regimes on transaction costs
both across and within firms. For example, Oren Bar-Gill and Gideon
Parchomovsky argue that the strength of intellectual property rights determines the boundary between the firm and the market.34 In this model,
strong patent and trade secret rights—by giving legal protection to information—allow more production activities to shift from firms to the market.35
Weak rights lead to the vertical integration of more innovative activity within
a firm.36 Similarly, Robert Merges and Ashish Arora have demonstrated that
strong IP rights give rise to smaller firms specializing in the supply of technology inputs—again, moving production activities towards the market.37 Scholars have also studied the impact of intellectual property protection on a
firm’s internal organizational structure. For example, Dan Burk argues that
both patent law and trade secret protection can serve to regulate the interactions of employees with each other and with their employer.38 And Paul
Heald has postulated a role for patent law in regulating transactions among
team members within a firm.39
economic historians as suffering from a “presentist” bias that “view[s] the present as the
final stage in an evolutionary process and thus, effectively, the end point of business history.” Lamoreaux et al., supra note 2, at 405. Indeed, shortly after the publication of
Chandler’s work it became clear that, at least in some industries, firms employing decentralized production mechanisms were able to surpass their vertically integrated competitors. Id.
31 Lamoreaux et al., supra note 2, at 423.
32 Coase, supra note 28.
33 See, e.g., Ashish Arora & Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights, and
Firm Boundaries, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451 (2004); Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Law and the Boundaries of Technology-Intensive Firms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1649
(2009); Dan L. Burk, Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (2004); Dan L.
Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing Intellectual Property Rights at
the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 575, 576.
34 See Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Intellectual Property Law and the Boundaries
of the Technology-Intensive Firm 1–2, (Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 480, 2004).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 See Arora & Merges, supra note 33.
38 See Burk, supra note 33, at 20.
39 See Heald, supra note 29, at 487; see also Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 34, at 2
(“Trade secret law and the legal treatment of covenants not to compete similarly affect
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This view of innovation divides the location of innovative activity into
two distinct arenas, both tied to the firm as the unit of innovation40: (1)
arms-length contracting between firms in the market; and (2) vertically-integrated production relationships inside firms.41 While the market organizes
production functions through bargaining, the firm does so through a hierarchical command-and-control structure.42
But studies on economic sociology show that there is a third arena where
innovation takes place. While economists and organization theorists tend to
focus on the rise of the “research corporation” (or research firm) as a key
driver of innovation in the twentieth century, sociologists (and sociologically
oriented economists) and historians of technology have emphasized the
importance of innovation networks.43 In industries with complex and rapidly advancing knowledge frontiers, important innovations take place neither
within a firm nor through market transactions. Rather, they emerge out of a
network of informal know-how exchanges among innovators in (often comfirm boundaries by determining the allocation of entitlements between firms and
employees.”).
40 Of course, within the firm it is individuals and teams of individuals who innovate.
And important innovation does happen outside the firm. Indeed, a large body of literature in intellectual property has sought to identify how intellectual property entitlements
impact individual motivations to innovate, and how firm and individual-level motivations
interact. See, e.g., LOBEL, supra note 27; Stephanie Plamondon Bair, The Psychology of Patent
Protection, 48 CONN. L. REV. 297 (2015) (arguing that the idea that intellectual property
protection motivates innovation needs to be reevaluated); Peter DiCola, Money from Music:
Survey Evidence on Musicians’ Revenue and Lessons About Copyright Incentives, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 1
(2013) (showing through survey evidence that only a small percentage of musicians receive
direct financial rewards from the copyright system); Lobel, supra note 27, at 790–91 (criticizing the expanding web of contractual agreements that surround employment contracts,
including covenants not to compete, and increased reliance on trade secrets for dampening individual creativity); Jessica Silbey, Harvesting Intellectual Property: Inspired Beginnings
and “Work-Makes-Work,” Two Stages in the Creative Processes of Artists and Innovators, 86 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2091, 2093 (2011) (showing through interview studies that intellectual property protection plays a small role in motivating artists and inventors (many of whom work
within firms) to create).
41 See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 33, at 1650 (“The question thus
becomes which stages of the inventive process should be integrated in a single firm and
which should be divided among different firms and traded on the market?”); Lamoreaux
et al., supra note 2.
42 In the 1970s and 1980s, economic historians and economists also focused almost
exclusively on the firm and not on industrial districts. See Francisco J. Ortega-Colomer,
Discussing the Concepts of Cluster and Industrial Districts, 11 J. TECH. MGMT. INNOVATION 139
(2016) (discussing the history of the emergence of the industrial district as compared to
the former study of only the firm district).
43 See, e.g., Ranjay Gulati, Alliances and Networks, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 293 (1998);
Lamoreaux, et al., supra note 2; Powell, supra note 2; Powell et al., supra note 2; Powell &
Giannella, supra note 2; Powell, Packalen & Whittington, supra note 8, at 434; see also Joel
M. Podolny & Karen L. Page, Network Forms of Organization, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 57, 59 (1998)
(describing networks as collections of actors who pursue “repeated, enduring exchange
relations with one another and, at the same time, lack a legitimate organizational authority
to arbitrate and resolve disputes that may arise during the exchange”).
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peting) firms.44 Walter Powell has theorized that networks represent a distinct third “locus” of innovation under which “cooperation and collaboration
proceed with only limited reliance on contracts and the legal system, on the
one hand, and on administrative fiat and bureaucratic routines, on the
other.”45
The next two sections synthesize historical and empirical studies on the
role of networks in innovation. They highlight the surprising historical significance of innovation networks during the Industrial Revolution and their
enduring relevance in modern innovation environments. Through this synthesis, this Article also uncovers a longstanding tension between “manager”
and “inventor” incentives vis-à-vis informal know-how trading within individual firms.46 Both during the Industrial Revolution and in present-day innovation clusters, inventors in complex industries are often members of
epistemic communities of engineers, biologists, chemists, and others that
transcend firm boundaries. When those epistemic communities favor openness and information sharing, and instill in their members an individual
interest in the overall advancement of a particular technology, inventors
working in disparate firms demonstrate a tendency for reciprocal informational exchange across firms. In contrast, managers are more likely to
eschew information-sharing across firm boundaries, even when such sharing
is likely to be reciprocal, and therefore likely to benefit all firms in the
industry.
B.

Innovation Networks: Historical Studies

No study on the history of technology would be complete without an
analysis of the role of the Industrial Revolution on the rate of technological
change. Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century technological advances in
steam engine, iron production, and textiles technologies are widely credited
with transforming predominantly agrarian, rural societies in Europe and
America into industrial and urban centers.47 The canonical view of the ori44 See supra note 43.
45 Powell, supra note 2, at 328.
46 This tension is distinct from the fundamental tension between inventors’ desires for
autonomy and mobility, and managers’ desires to prevent the mobility of the inventors
they have trained. See Nathan Hamler, The Impending Merger of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine and Negative Trade Secrets: Is Trade Secrets Law Headed in the Right Direction?, 25 J. CORP.
L. 383, 388 (2000) (“[A]t the heart of trade secrets law lies one of the most fundamental
policy conflicts that the law and society must deal with: the interests of the employer or
business versus the interests of the employee. The law has consistently struggled to draw
an acceptable line between these two interests.”). In contrast, the tension identified in this
Article centers less on inventors’ desires for mobility and career advancement and more on
inventors’ membership in a broader epistemic community of scientists and their shared
vision and enthusiasm for the advancement of particular technological frontiers.
47 See, e.g., THE BRITISH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (Joel
Mokyr ed., 1999); Joel Mokyr, The Institutional Origins of the Industrial Revolution, in INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 64 (Elhanan Helpman ed., 2008).
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gins of the Industrial Revolution emphasizes the importance of two factors48:
First, individual “heroic” inventors, whose creative leaps led to dramatic technological advances;49 second, the increased availability of patents and legal
trade secret protections that allowed these inventors to appropriate the products of their research efforts.50 But a series of historical studies in key industries during the Industrial Revolution tell a different story.
Robert Allen, in his study of the nineteenth-century blast furnace industry in Cleveland, U.K., was among the first to point out that crucial improvements in furnace efficiency did not emerge from the work of distinct,
individual innovators whose efforts were granted patent protection.51
Rather, Allen coined the term “collective invention” to describe the incremental series of improvements to blast furnaces carried out through the
open exchange of information and know-how among competing furnace
manufacturers.52 Indeed, Allen discovered an astonishing degree of information sharing in the blast furnace industry.53 Surprisingly, information
exchange took place not only among established industry players but also
included industry entrants.54 As Allen describes it:
[I]f a firm constructed a new plant of novel design and that plant proved to
have lower costs than other plants, these facts were made available to other
firms in the industry and to potential entrants. The next firm constructing a
new plant could build on the experience of the first by introducing and
extending the design change that had proved profitable. The operating
characteristics of this second plant would then also be made available to
potential investors.55

Information on furnace height and heat capacity, for example, was
made available both through informal disclosure and publication in trade
(engineering) literature.56 Notable in this process of information disclosure
was the ubiquity of know-how sharing, which took place through frequent
visits to competitor’s factories to collect data on furnace design and efficiency.57 Blast engineers also frequently published their data in trade publi48 See, e.g., T.S. ASHTON, THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION (1958).
49 See generally James Bessen & Alessandro Nuvolari, Knowledge Sharing Among Inventors:
Some Historical Perspectives, in REVOLUTIONIZING INNOVATION: USERS, COMMUNITIES AND OPEN
INNOVATION (2012); Mokyr, supra note 47.
50 See Bessen & Nuvolari, supra note 49; Mokyr, supra note 47.
51 Allen, supra note 5, at 2 (“However, if one examines a sector like the blast furnace
industry and determines the inventions whose diffusion were important for the growth in
efficiency, it proves impossible to attribute their discovery to any single inventor. Certainly,
no one received a patent for many of these advances.”).
52 Id.
53 Id. at 6–7.
54 Id. at 9.
55 Id. at 2.
56 Id. at 8.
57 Id.
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cations, and provided detailed presentations to engineering societies, which
served as “forums for the presentation of technical material.”58
What explains this free exchange of know-how among competitors?
Traditional incentive theories of innovation predict either that firms would
keep such know-how as a trade secret or protect it with patents. Indeed,
under the transactional theories of patents and trade secrets advanced by
Bar-Gill, Parchomovsky, Merges, and Arora, it is largely through the legal
protection afforded by patents and trade secrets that innovation moves from
firms to the market.59 Allen provides two potential explanations for his
observations that deviate from the traditional, transactional view outlined in
Section I.A. First, engineers who worked on blast furnaces were part of a
small epistemic community that rotated among several ironmasters. Information trading among these engineers may initially have served to advance
their “professional ambitions”—signaling their technical expertise to their
peers and helping with career advancement.60 Over time, however, and
regardless of the initial reasons for know-how trading, these engineers developed a series of social norms that favored openness and reciprocal information-sharing.61
This first explanation is intriguing because engineers may have been acting at cross-purposes with their employing firms. But if this was the case, it is
hard to understand why nineteenth-century firms did not oppose such disclosing behavior. Allen’s second explanation may help answer this question.
Allen postulates that the type of know-how that was exchanged across firm
boundaries was incremental in nature. In other words, no single piece of
know-how was a game changer that could give its holder a large competitive
advantage. As Allen emphasizes:
Each individual has some cherished bit of knowledge, some trade secret
which he hoards carefully. Perhaps by sharing it with others, he might
impart useful information; but by an open discussion and interchange he
would, almost for certain, learn a dozen things in exchange for the one
given away. General increase of knowledge would give general improved
practice, most likely a larger use of the materials in which a manufacturer is
interested.62

Nevertheless, there is an implicit tension in the dual role of engineers as
both employees of competing organizations and members of an epistemic
community interested in the overall advance of a particular technology. As I
explain and expand later, this tension continues to be present in modern
innovation contexts.
What is clear from Allen’s research, however, is that the aggregate social
impact of the myriad know-how exchanges across individual firms was
58 Id.
59 See generally Arora & Merges, supra note 33; Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 33.
60 Allen, supra note 5, at 17.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 19 (quoting Gerard A. Muntz, The Relation Between Science and Practice and Its
Bearing on the Utility of the Institute of Metals, 1 J. INST. METALS 286, 291 (1909)).
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immense. Taken together, these exchanges enabled collective increases in
blast furnace height from fifty to eighty feet and in blast temperature from
600 °F to 1400 °F and were crucial for productivity growth in this industrial
region.63
Allen also notes that firms may have allowed the informal exchange of
relevant know-how because “it would have been costly to keep it secret.”64
Specifically, Allen emphasizes the high rate of mobility of engineers in the
blast furnace industry, who often shifted quickly from firm to firm. In other
words, the structure of the labor market for furnace engineers made it too
costly for firms to rely on either self-help or trade secret protection to prevent
information leakage. On its face, this explanation is puzzling. After all, one
of the justifications for having trade secrets is precisely that the legal protection they offer firms lowers the costs of keeping information secret. Absent
trade secret protection, the theory goes, firms may overinvest in private measures for keeping any valuable information secret. Trade secret law prevents
such overinvestment by providing a cause of action against those who misappropriate secret information.65 This case study thus provides a powerful
counterexample to this traditional understanding of trade secret law. It suggests that under some conditions—incremental know-how trading, and an
epistemic community with social norms of open-sharing—lack of trade secret
protection may lead to openness rather than excessive efforts at secrecy.
But what can an isolated case study about the iron industry in nineteenth-century England tell us about the Industrial Revolution? Quite a lot,
it turns out. Despite initial critiques of Allen’s study as being unrepresentative of broader trends, a series of more recent studies suggest otherwise.66
For example, Alessandro Nuvolari’s 2004 study of the development of steam
technology argues that, “together with individual inventors, collective invention settings were a crucial source of innovation during the early phases of
industrialisation.”67 The steam engine engineers described in Nuvolari’s
study shared information about engine performance much like the engineers in Allen’s study. Steam engine engineers published a widely consulted
63
64
65

Id. at 3.
Id. at 17.
See, e.g., Mark Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Law, 61
STAN. L. REV. 311 (2008); see also infra Section II.A.
66 See, e.g., ROBERT C. ALLEN, THE BRITISH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2009) (describing improvements in coal burning houses in seventeenth century
London as instances of collective innovation); CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: THE ENGLISH PATENT SYSTEM, 1660–1800, at 113 (1988) (describing collective innovation as a key driver in clock and instrument-making); Robert Allen, The
Industrial Revolution in Miniature: The Spinning Jenny in Britain, France and India, 69 J. ECON.
HIST. 901 (2009) (describing improvements to the spinning jenny as a process of collective
innovation); Bessen & Nuvolari, supra note 49 (synthesizing historical studies on collective
innovation); Lamoreaux et al., supra note 2, at 417 (describing episodes of collective innovation in Philadelphia’s textile sector); Nuvolari, supra note 5.
67 Nuvolari, supra note 5, at 349.
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technical bulletin.68 And they informally revealed information to each other
about engine performance. Steam engineers were also part of an epistemic
community with high labor mobility: because engineers were recruited on a
one-off basis, they often worked in many of the firms in that geographic
area.69 Nuvolari hypothesizes that publication in the technical bulletin also
served to “signal their talents hence improving career prospects.”70 And
these disclosures did not disadvantage their employers. To the contrary,
because the technology at issue was complex and engineers shared small,
incremental pieces of information, this type of know-how sharing allowed the
“pooling [of] all accumulated experience . . . focus[ing] the search process
on the most promising directions.”71 Other case studies of key technological
innovations, such as steamboats, textile machinery, and airplanes, in both
Europe and the Americas, have revealed additional instances of “collective
innovation.”72
In all of the industries that were the subject of these historical case studies, innovation took place precisely in the spaces of intersection between distinct firm knowledge. Historians of technology often contrast this early
system of “collective innovation” with the system of large corporate R&D laboratories that emerged in the early and mid-twentieth-century.73 The rise of
the corporate laboratory as the locus of innovation was thought to have
eclipsed collective innovation models. More recent empirical studies on
innovation, however, reveal the resurgence of “collective efforts by networks
of inventors, distributed across organizations and spanning distant locations.”74 The next Section fast-forwards to present-day innovation, synthesizing empirical studies in biotechnology and other industries where knowledge
networks continue to play an increasingly crucial role in innovation.
C.

Innovation Networks: Empirical Studies

Changes in technological innovation—most notably increasing knowledge specialization coupled with the increasing complexity of innovations—
have led to what some researchers term a “second wave” of collective innovation.75 For example, empirical studies on knowledge flows in the biotechnology industry reveal that the two most prolific biotechnology clusters in the
United States, the Bay Area and Boston clusters, are characterized by high
knowledge-flows among competing start-up firms.76 Knowledge sharing is
68 Id. at 357.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 356.
72 See, e.g., Lamoreaux et al., supra note 2, at 417 (describing episodes of collective
innovation in Philadelphia’s textile sector).
73 See, e.g., CHANDLER, supra note 30; LESLIE HANNAH, THE RISE OF THE CORPORATE
ECONOMY (1976).
74 Powell & Giannella, supra note 2, at 1.
75 Id. at 5 (dating the origin of this “second wave” to the 1980s).
76 Powell et al., supra note 2.
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also considered a crucial element in software development in these two
regions.77 Eric von Hippel has also documented instances of modern informal information-sharing by engineers working in mini-mills.78
Walter Powell and Eric Giannella have suggested that we define this
modern version of collective innovation as “technological advance driven by
knowledge sharing among a community of inventors who are often employed
by organizations with competing intellectual property interests.”79 This Article adopts Powell’s definition, as it highlights the fundamental puzzle of collective innovation: What incentivizes actors with competing intellectual
property interests to share crucial know-how?
No single factor explains this second wave of collective innovation.
Rather, a series of factors that includes characteristics of both inventor communities and the inventions themselves makes collective innovation more
likely. The inventor community qualities that promote information sharing
have been identified as follows. Individual innovators working within a firm
may reveal firm-specific know-how to other innovators who are part of their
77 The Silicon Valley and Boston regions have been the subject of detailed historical
and network-analytic studies for two “periods” of technological development in two distinct
technology areas: the explosion of the electronics industry in the late 1970s, and the emergence of biotechnology in the late 1980s. See, e.g., PONTUS BRAUNERHJELM & MARYANN P.
FELDMAN, CLUSTER GENESIS: TECHNOLOGY-BASED INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT (2007);
ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY
AND ROUTE 128 (1996); Lee Fleming et al., Why the Valley Went First: Aggregation and Emergence in Regional Inventor Networks, in THE EMERGENCE OF ORGANIZATIONS AND MARKETS,
supra note 8, at 520; Powell & Giannella, supra note 2; AnnaLee Saxenian, Inside-Out:
Regional Networks and Industrial Adaptation in Silicon Valley and Route 128, 2 CITYSCAPE: J. POL.
& RES. 41 (1996). In traditional economic analyses of innovation, these two regions are
routinely identified as “regional clusters.” Such clusters are predicted to enjoy greater economic productivity by taking advantage of “external economies of scale”—factors external
to single firms that provide economic benefits to the entire region. Specifically, regional
clusters prosper because of both knowledge spillovers across firms and the easier availability of a large skilled labor pool, specialized suppliers, and other specialized infrastructure
and services. See, e.g., PAUL KRUGMAN, GEOGRAPHY AND TRADE (1991); MICHAEL PIORE &
CHARLES SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE: POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY (1984); Brett
M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007); Paul Krugman, Increasing Returns and Economic Geography, 99 J. POL. ECON. 483 (1991). Network analyses of regional clusters focus on understanding how social and technical networks among
both firms and inventors influence economic productivity by influencing knowledge flows
across firms. See, e.g., Fleming & Frenken, supra note 8; Powell & Giannella, supra note 2;
Saxenian, supra.
78 See von Hippel, supra note 5, at 294. As was the case with know-how exchange in the
Industrial Revolution, this exchange was incremental, with each piece of know-how having
“only a small individual impact on production costs . . . , [but a large] collective impact.”
Id. In von Hippel’s study the type of information that was exchanged across the informal
network was regulated by social norms among engineers themselves. Engineers made “a
judgment as to the competitive value of the information [another engineer was] requesting. If it seems to him vital to his own firm’s competitive position, he will not provide it.”
Id. at 292.
79 Powell & Giannella, supra note 2, at 4.
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epistemic community, but who are nonetheless working for competing
firms.80 Individuals are motivated to disclose know-how both for career
advancement reasons (that is, to signal their deep expertise) and when they
are personally invested in seeking advances in a new technological frontier.81
These individual incentives to disclose are often reinforced by their belonging to epistemic communities of innovators that cut across individual firm
boundaries and favor open information sharing.82 For example, studies on
the Boston and Bay Area biotechnology clusters show that innovators
involved in biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies belonged to epistemic communities of biologists anchored in research universities. In these
two clusters, norms of openness and collaboration—characteristic of basic
university research—migrated (albeit in attenuated forms) to the private
realm.83
In addition, technologies where collective innovation has been observed
share certain characteristics. They tend to be fast-moving and to require the
combination of deep expertise in multiple technical domains.84 Because
knowledge in these complex, emerging fields is increasingly fragmented and
specialized, it is hard for individual firms to remain abreast of developments
in these fields, and to host all the necessary expertise in-house.85 In these
industries, collective innovation may emerge as an efficient strategy to access
relevant (and often complementary) information.86 Further, these complex
areas of innovation are often highly uncertain.87 Participation in collective
efforts lowers the risk of failure for each party involved—acting as a form of
insurance.88
Finally, in any new, complex technology there are several “bottleneck”
steps that impact the viability and the direction of the technology, but whose
benefits are hard for a single party to appropriate. Examples of this type of
80 See, e.g., Fleming et al., supra note 77; Powell & Giannella, supra note 2, at 19 (“Cultures of technology are important because they help explain the continuity of an underlying technical community despite temporal shifts in organizing for collective invention
versus private R&D.”).
81 See, e.g., Powell & Giannella, supra note 2, at 3 (“Many technological systems reflect
a confluence of uncoordinated research efforts driven by intense and widespread interests
that intersect around the development of a novel technology.”).
82 See, e.g., Brad K. Wray, The Epistemic Significance of Collaborative Research, 69 PHIL.
SCIENCE 150 (2002) (arguing that the increasing dependence of technical personnel on
common equipment socializes scientists and engineers into norms of collective work).
83 For example, Powell, Packalen & Whittington, supra note 8, explain how “[b]oth
Genentech and Chiron adopted and refined UCSF’s team model, insisting that their scientists publish in academic journals, but added the impatience of venture capital financial
backers with their focus on swinging for the fences.” Id. at 447.
84 See, e.g., Dahl & Pedersen, supra note 8; Gulati, supra note 43; Powell & Giannella,
supra note 2; James Bessen & Alessandro Nuvolari, Knowledge Sharing Among Inventors: Some
Historical Perspectives (Boston Univ. Sch. Law Working Paper No. 11–51, 2011).
85 See sources cited supra note 84.
86 See sources cited supra note 84.
87 See sources cited supra note 84.
88 See sources cited supra note 84.
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bottleneck step include exploratory research to find new problems at the
intersection of multiple fields, and research that reduces the overall uncertainty of carrying out particular types of interdisciplinary research.89 In traditional models of intellectual property, this inability to appropriate the
products of exploratory or uncertainty-reducing research is predicted to lead
to a market failure: despite the overall social benefits of the research, no
individual firm would be incentivized to carry it out. One traditional
response to this type of market failure is to increase the strength of intellectual property rights, or to directly subsidize exploratory research.90 Under
this traditional paradigm, stronger trade secrets or patent rights, by increasing appropriability, would increase the incentives for a single firm to engage
in risky exploratory research. Paradoxically, empirical studies on this type of
complex technology demonstrate that firms will sometimes self-organize into
collective innovation clusters to solve this appropriability problem.91 In
other words, open-sharing rather than increased intellectual property protection can be the key to addressing bottlenecks in complex innovation.
Studies of biotechnology clusters suggest that successful clusters92 have
strong “anchor tenants”—well-connected organizations that help broker
local relationships with diverse players, including venture capital, start-ups,
and established pharmaceutical companies.93 Successful biotechnology clusters in Boston, the San Francisco Bay Area, and San Diego also established
early governance systems that provided an “interactional template” to promote collective innovation.94 As a result all three clusters are characterized
by a high degree of interfirm collaboration among competitor biotech
companies.95
89 See, e.g., Winter Mason & Duncan J. Watts, Collaborative Learning in Networks, 109
PNAS 764 (2012).
90 See, e.g., Richard Nelson, The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research, 67 J. POL.
ECON. 297 (1959).
91 See, e.g., Lamoreaux et al., supra note 2; Powell, supra note 2; Powell et al., supra
note 2; Powell & Giannella, supra note 2.
92 See Powell, Packalen & Whittington, supra note 8, at 434, 451.
93 Id. at 459.
94 Powell & Giannella, supra note 2, at 21–22.
95 THE EMERGENCE OF ORGANIZATIONS AND MARKETS, supra note 8, at 376 (The authors
identify “three crucial factors: organizational diversity; anchor tenant organizations that
protect the norms of a community and provide relational glue across multiple affiliations;
and a sequence of network formation that starts with local connections and subsequently
expands to global linkages.”). The studies cited in this Section for the biotechnology and
IT industries rely on patent co-authorship, licensing agreements, and R&D collaborations
to graph the network of relationships among different players (including their social distance), to identify inventor clusters, and to trace how these networks change over time.
The resulting network captures both formal and informal relationships. Several of the
studies cited in this Section rely also on key informant interviews, surveys, or participant
observations to round out information regarding the nature of information flows (formal
vs. informal) within each cluster. See Powell, Packalen & Whittington, supra note 8 (graphing relationships in several biotechnology clusters based on R&D agreements, licensing
agreements and financing deals); see also Fleming et al., supra note 77 (analyzing inventor
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One of the most interesting observations regarding these successful clusters is the extent to which social norms from each realm (private business
and universities) were recombined and transposed across private-public
boundaries—a factor particularly salient in Silicon Valley clusters. Private
biotech firms in the Bay Area “adopted academic norms of publishing and
collaboration and repurposed them into the world of commerce through
extensive affiliations with other biotech companies and universities.”96 All
the while, Stanford (the area’s “anchor tenant”) embraced the academic
entrepreneurship model.97 In turn, the success of San Diego start-ups was
due in large part to the strong networks of information-exchange among
employees. These networks were established somewhat serendipitously: most
founders of San Diego start-ups had previously worked at a failed diagnosticsfocused company (Hybritech), which had been acquired by Eli Lilly.98 After
Hybritech’s failure, former employees remained in the San Diego area,
founded the second-generation San Diego start-ups, and “created a context
in which job mobility and information sharing took place”99 by collaborating
with each other and with scientists at the multiple research institutes and
universities in the area.100
When comparing successful and failed clusters, researchers found that
the most important difference between them was the absence, in the failed
group, of thick local relational ties that fostered the recombination of social
norms, information-sharing, and joint problem solving.101 For this reason,
researchers hypothesize that the creation of a culture of open-sharing in successful clusters required local social ties, in addition to a background epistemic community with shared social norms.102 In the case of successful
network using co-authored patents with a five year moving window, and key informant
interviews); Amalya L. Oliver & Julia Porter Liebeskind, Three Levels of Networking for Sourcing Intellectual Capital in Biotechnology: Implications for Studying Interorganizational Networks, 27
INT’L STUD. MGMT. & ORG., no. 4, 1997, at 76 (interview studies); Kjersten Bunker Whittington, Jason Owen-Smith & Walter W. Powell, Networks, Propinquity, and Innovation in
Knowledge-Intensive Industries, 54 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 90 (2009) (R&D and licensing contract
data).
96 Powell, Packalen & Whittington, supra note 8, at 449.
97 See generally Jeannette A. Colyvas, From Divergent Meanings to Common Practices: The
Early Institutionalization of Technology Transfer in the Life Sciences at Stanford University, 36 RES.
POL. 456 (2007).
98 Powell, Packalen & Whittington, supra note 8, at 449.
99 Id. at 450.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 451 (“In contrast to the successful clusters, [in failed clusters] local ties are
rather sparse. The bulk of collaboration occurs with partners outside the regions, suggesting that local knowledge exchange and interorganizational labor mobility are rather
limited.”). “Failed clusters” were those located in “the broader New York metropolitan
area, northern New Jersey, the Philadelphia metropolitan area, the Washington, D.C.
metro area, the Research Triangle in North Carolina, Houston, Seattle, and the Los Angeles metro area.” Id. at 450.
102 Id. at 451
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clusters, thick local ties eventually expanded globally.103 The reverse was not
the case: failed clusters that began with external ties never developed thick
local relationships.104 It is precisely through the local exchange and recombination of information and know-how that biotechnology clusters flourished
and expanded.
The importance of local informational exchange for cluster success
raises an important follow-up question: Precisely what type of information is
exchanged informally across firm boundaries? Several case studies suggest
that the know-how exchanged in the industries where this behavior has been
documented is “incremental.”105 In fact, one study defines technical knowhow precisely as an incremental piece of secret information that, in isolation,
is “not vital to a firm” and “can be independently developed by any competent firm needing it, given an appropriate expenditure of time and
money.”106
Of course, some pieces of technical know-how can result in major competitive advantages, either because of the timing of its discovery in a fastpaced industry or because it cannot be routinely reinvented. In the industries where informal know-how exchanges have been documented, however,
there appears to be a conscious self-monitoring on the part of employeeinventors regarding which pieces of technical know-how to share and which
ones to keep secret that tracks the commercial value of the information.107
As Eric von Hippel describes: “B makes a judgment as to the competitive
value of the information A is requesting. If it seems to him vital to his own
firm’s competitive position, he will not provide it.”108 This finding is not too
surprising. After all, despite assertions about basic scientific communities’
commitment to openness, secrecy is quite common in epistemic communities of scientists. In fact, employee-inventors are likely transposing similar
filters regarding which information to reveal and which to keep secret that
pervade basic scientific research.109
Finally, informal know-how exchange through epistemic networks will
only be sustainable if there are strong social norms that favor reciprocity and
that punish lack of cooperation. Each individual inventor may be continuously tempted to defect, because she will receive higher returns by defecting
if her trading partner continues to behave cooperatively. Enforcement
103 Id. at 457.
104 Id.
105 Allen, supra note 5; von Hippel, supra note 5. Two types of incremental know-how
appear to be frequently exchanged through informal networks: 1) “negative know-how” or
knowledge about what does not work to solve a problem, and 2) knowledge about how to
successfully perform publicly available protocols. Id.
106 Von Hippel, supra note 5, at 298; see also Schrader, supra note 8, at 165.
107 See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 8, at 114; Schrader, supra note 8, at 165; von Hippel,
supra note 5, at 292.
108 Von Hippel, supra note 5, at 292.
109 See, e.g., John P. Walsh & Wei Hong, Secrecy Is Increasing in Step with Competition, 422
NATURE 801 (2003); Koen Vermeir & Dániel Margócsy, States of Secrecy: An Introduction, 45
BR. J. HIS. SCI. 153 (2002).
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appears to take place through negative reputational effects that reduce
others’ willingness to share information in the future. Indeed, interviews
suggest that researchers at biotechnology firms are sensitive to the negative
reputational repercussions of failing to share reciprocally.110
The studies synthesized above contrast areas where productive clusters
formed (Boston, Silicon Valley, and San Diego) with those where regional
clusters failed to emerge. In a frequently cited study, AnnaLee Saxenian
compared the productivity of the Boston and Silicon Valley clusters themselves. Saxenian argued that the different productivities of the two regions—
with Boston losing its place to Silicon Valley as the dominant player in information technology—can be explained in part by the differences in social network structures between the two regions.111 Silicon Valley, with its “[l]oosely
linked team structures [that] encourage[d] horizontal communication
among firm[ ] divisions and with outside suppliers and customers,”112 gained
a competitive edge against autarkic and secretive Boston firms that discouraged outside collaboration.113 But more recent analyses have cast some
doubts on this narrative.114 Although Boston’s preeminence as a center for
IT research declined, it has re-emerged as a center for biotechnology
research.115 Network research mapping social relationships among inventors
across firms shows that the inventors’ social networks in both regions are
remarkably similar.116 So are their motivations for engaging in informal
information-sharing.117 Further, while firms in Silicon Valley were more
likely to allow information-sharing across firm boundaries, the most salient
finding in subsequent research studies is that of an enduring tension in both

110 See Oliver & Liebeskind, supra note 95, at 86 (quoting a research scientist at a biotechnology firm: “[Biotechnology firms] have gained the reputation that they try to get
information out of university researchers, but do not share their own work in return. As a
result, at international conferences, university professors avoid talking with us. This is our
opportunity to help some university scientists, in exchange for some unspecified returns
from them. In the long run, the company benefits.”).
111 Saxenian, supra note 77, at 41–42.
112 Id. at 45.
113 Id. This reasoning is in line with other research pointing to the importance of
relaxed enforcement of legal proscription of noncompete covenants. See, e.g., Angel, supra
note 8; Gilson, supra note 27.
114 See Jonathan M. Barnett & Ted Sichelman, Revisiting Labor Mobility in Innovation
Markets (USC Legal Studies Research Papers Series No. 16-15, 2016), https://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2758854.
115 See, e.g., Fleming et al., supra note 77, at 521.
116 See, e.g., id. at 538 (“The analyses suggested that the Valley’s greater degree of aggregation was not caused by a fundamental difference in the microsocial structure of its collaborative network. Indeed, the analyses . . . indicated that the top six components of the
two regions were quite similar, with the exception that the GTE/Siliconix component was
more densely networked than its Valley counterpart.”).
117 See id.
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regions between managers and inventors regarding the desirability of information flow.118
This tension between firms’ (or managers’) and inventors’ attitudes
towards information flow has important consequences for trade secret theory
and doctrine that have not been explored in the legal literature. The next
Part begins this conversation. It analyzes how focusing on knowledge networks as loci of innovation in complex and emerging fields should impact
trade secret theory and doctrine, paying particular attention to how trade
secret law affects both inventor and firm incentives to disclose information.
II.
A.

IMPLICATIONS

FOR

TRADE SECRET LAW THEORY

Utilitarian Theories of Trade Secret Protection

Trade secret law sits uncomfortably among the core intellectual property
regimes of copyright and patent law. The primary justification for both copyright and patent law is utilitarian: these two regimes are needed to incentivize
creativity and innovation.119 But trade secrets do not fit neatly within this
incentive story. Indeed, legal scholars as well as treatise and restatement writers have alternately classified trade secrets as belonging to tort and contract
law—in addition to intellectual property law.120 Do trade secrets serve to
preserve commercial ethics, and thus properly belong to tort law? Or is trade
118 See id. (“We are struck by the bi-modal distribution of attitudes on the issue [of
information flows], mainly along professional lines and independent of the region. Most
of the inventors from both regions expressed similar laissez-faire, open, and positive attitudes toward information flow. Many of their stories described an effort to evade efforts by
management to contain their boundary-crossing collaborations.”). Other studies have
found a similar tension. See, e.g., Sharon Mollman Elliott, The Threat from Within: Trade
Secret Theft by Employees, 25 NATURE BIOTECH. 293, 293 (2007); Oliver & Liebeskind, supra
note 95, at 86 (noting that managers had given their inventors “clear instructions not to”
share information with other firms, but that such sharing nonetheless took place); von
Hippel, supra note 5, at 296 (“Interestingly, however, trading seems a more quasi-covert,
secretive activity by engineering staffs in some of these industries than was the case in steel
minimills.”); Emily Waltz, Under Wraps, 27 NATURE BIOTECH. 880 (2009); Susan Wright &
David A. Wallace, Varieties of Secrets and Secret Varieties: The Case of Biotechnology, 19 POL. &
LIFE SCI. 33 (2000).
119 See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW & ECONOMICS, VOLUME II. CIVIL LAW AND ECONOMICS 129 (Boudewijn Bouckaert &
Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
120 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 355 (2003) (Because remedies for breach of trade secrets are
defined by common law principles “without regard to trade secrets or to information in
general . . . in a sense there is no law of trade secrets.”); Robert G. Bone, A New Look at
Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 243 (1998) (The
author argues that “trade secret liability should be governed mainly by contract principles.”); Jerome H. Reichman, How Trade Secrecy Law Generates a Natural Semicommons of Innovative Know-How, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 185; Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade
Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007) (“Trade secrets are curious anomalies
in intellectual property law.”); Michael Risch, Trade Secret Law and Information Development
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secret law simply concerned with enforcing (sometimes implicit) contractual
agreements between employers and employees, and thus the province of contract law? In view of this doctrinal confusion, some scholars have called for
the abolition of trade secret law altogether.121 A second group of scholars,
however, has developed a utilitarian, incentives-based view of trade secret law,
which has become the predominant view of innovation scholars.122 This Part
argues that understanding complex innovation as emerging out of networks
of informal information-sharing across firms calls into question this incentives story in the context of complex innovation.
Utilitarian theory posits that trade secrets incentivize innovation in two
ways. According to the first, the “gap filler” function of trade secrets is
grounded on the ability of trade secrets to incentivize the production of types
of information not protected by patent law.123 According to the second,
trade secret protection functions to prevent excessive (and thus inefficient)
private investment in self-help measures to keep information secret.124
Landes & Posner examined when a rational inventor would choose trade
secret protection over patent law.125 They argue that trade secrets are preferable to a rational inventor when patent protection is too costly in relation to
the value of his or her invention.126 Obtaining a patent involves a lengthy
application process before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO).127 Because the USPTO publishes all patent applications eighteen
months after filing, a patent applicant also runs the risk of being denied patent protection but nonetheless having made available to the public important information contained in his or her application.128 This risk is obviously
more salient for inventions that are likely not patentable.129 But a rational
innovator may choose trade secrecy even for clearly patentable innovations
when the cost of patenting (including the disclosure requirements) exceeds
Incentives, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY
RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 152.
121 See Bone, supra note 120, at 245–46 (“I propose that we stop seeking a functional
justification for trade secret law and recognize this body of law for what it really is—a
collection of other legal wrongs.”); see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 120, at 355 (The
authors argue that “in a sense there is no law of trade secrets.”).
122 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 65, at 313; W. Nicholson Price II, Making Do in Making
Drugs: Innovation Policy and Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, 55 B.C. L. REV. 491, 532–39
(2014); W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Competition
and Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1044–50 (2016); Risch, Why Do We Have Trade
Secrets?, supra note 120, at 5–6.
123 See Lemley, supra note 65, at 326.
124 See id. at 340.
125 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 120, at 356–57.
126 See id. at 357.
127 See, e.g., David Popp, Ted Juhl & Daniel K.N. Johnson, Time in Purgatory: Examining
the Grant Lag for U.S. Patent Applications, 4 TOPICS ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y, no. 1, 2004, at 1.
128 See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2012) (confidential status of applications; publication of patent
applications).
129 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 120, at 358.
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the projected value of the innovation.130 In this context, trade secrets serve
the “gap filling” role of protecting commercially valuable but unpatentable
information, as well as patentable information that is too costly to patent—
for example in fast moving industries where the length of time to obtain a
patent makes patent protection impractical.131
What, then, would happen if trade secret law was unavailable to this
rational innovator? First, firms may inefficiently over-invest in self-help measures to ensure secrecy.132 In the absence of a legal remedy against trade
secret misappropriation, Landes and Posner hypothesize, “employers might
be led to reorganize their businesses in a manner that might be grossly inefficient were it not for the imperative of secrecy.”133 The Supreme Court in
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.134 made a similar argument in favor of trade
secret protection. In Kewanee Oil, the Court predicted that abolishing trade
secret protection would lead to “an increase in the amount of self-help that
innovative companies would employ.”135 By providing a legal remedy for the
misappropriation of secret information, trade secret law serves as a substitute
for excessive private efforts to ensure the security and inaccessibility of secret
information.136
Second, the Court in Kewanee Oil also predicted that abrogation of trade
secret protection would lead to the dispersion of knowledge among employees and to the fragmentation of “organized scientific and technological
research” to the detriment of society as a whole.137 Such knowledge dispersion, the Court postulated, would arise from the reluctance of employers to
disclose fully important firm information to any but the most trusted employees.138 In this context, trade secret law is thought to serve an important
130 See id. at 357.
131 See id. at 359; see also Lemley, supra note 65, at 326. Of course, a rational innovator
would also choose to keep an innovation secret when he or she thinks that he or she has a
very good chance of maintaining secrecy for a sufficiently long period of time. But we are
less concerned about this third type of innovation: trade secret law is unlikely to have an
incentive effect on those innovations that are easy to keep secret using private means.
132 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 120, at 364.
133 Id.
134 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
135 Id. at 485–86.
136 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 65, at 313 (“Trade secret law develops as a substitute for
the physical and contractual restrictions those companies would otherwise impose in an
effort to prevent competitors from acquiring their information.”).
137 Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 486.
138 Id. (“The innovative entrepreneur with limited resources would tend to confine his
research efforts to himself and those few he felt he could trust without the ultimate assurance of legal protection against breaches of confidence.”); see also Fisk, supra note 27, at
476 (“The Du Pont company’s difficulties with competitors trying to learn its methods by
recruiting away its employees may have prompted it to take even more care to exclude
strangers from its mills.”); David D. Friedman, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 61, 67 (1991) (arguing that failure to
enforce trade secrets against employees may lead employers to “reorganize their businesses
in inefficient forms—perhaps by splitting up tasks among more employees so that each
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internal coordinating mechanism: fostering efficient information disclosure
to inventors within a firm. This is the type of function for intellectual property law analyzed both by Heald and Burk, and described in Part I.139
A third postulated consequence of weak trade secret protection is an
underinvestment in employee training. Trade secret protection of business
know-how incentivizes firm investment in employee training by making it
more likely that firms will be able to recoup the costs of such training
through employee productivity. As a consequence, employers will either
decline to hire the employee or choose to hire him or her but underinvest in
his or her training.140
B.

How Knowledge Networks Research Impacts Utilitarian Theories
of Trade Secret Law

To synthesize the arguments presented above, utilitarian theories of
trade secret protection predict the following three inefficient outcomes will
ensue from lack of trade secret protection: (1) inefficient overinvestment in
self-help measures; (2) fragmentation of scientific and technological
research; and (3) underinvestment in employee training. These conclusions
are based on predictions about how a rational firm may behave, and on balancing the predicted social costs against the benefits of enforcing secrets.
The social costs include reduced information flow across firms, and the social
benefits include the elimination of the three inefficient outcomes listed
above.
But studies on collective innovation and knowledge networks show that
in some contexts these social costs are grossly exaggerated. Instead, in complex and fast-moving industries characterized by cross-cutting epistemic communities, low or no trade secret protection is likely to lead to the formation
of innovation networks—rather than an increase in inefficient defensive
maneuvers.141 In other words, in industries where knowledge networks are
likely to form, the social benefits of information sharing likely outweigh the
benefits of enforcing secrecy through (strong) trade secret law. Below, I analyze in more detail how knowledge networks and the tension between managknows less, or by bringing in family members (even though they may be less competent) as
employees, counting on them to be loyal out of altruism or because the family setting often
enables effective, informal retaliation against the disloyal”); cf. Elliott, supra note 118; Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1999).
139 See Burk, supra note 33; Heald, supra note 29; see also supra Part I.
140 An employer subject to these potential costs faces two choices. The employer can
either decline to hire the employee or hire the employee but underinvest in training and
the development and transmission of proprietary information.
141 Indeed, when analyzing whether “reverse engineering” should be considered misappropriation of trade secrets, Friedman, Landes, and Posner argue that because manufacturers learn “things they can put to use in their own design of new products” through
reverse engineering, and because the cost of enforcing secrecy through the legal system is
high, “[i]n the case of reverse engineering . . . the social cost-benefit calculus appears to
favor denial of legal protection.” Friedman, Landes & Posner, supra note 138, at 67.
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ers and inventors’ incentive structures influence each of the three benefits of
trade secret protection previously identified in the literature.
1.

Inefficient Overinvestment in Self-Help Measures

Knowledge networks research suggests that, when it is hard to keep
information secret, some industries will build information-sharing innovation
networks—rather than higher walls to protect their secrets.142 For example,
when faced with difficulties keeping their inventions secret, steel and coal
industries formed innovation clusters.143 In these clusters, epistemic communities of engineers freely shared some technical know-how across industry
boundaries. Rather than weakening individual firm productivity, such information sharing led to episodes of collective innovation in which small, incremental innovative steps led to massive increases in aggregate productivity.144
Similarly, the rise of biotechnology owes much to free, informal know-how
sharing across private-private and private-public boundaries. Biotechnology
clusters in Silicon Valley, Boston, and San Diego, for example, were more
successful than biotechnology ventures in other major cities precisely
because employees shared information across firm boundaries, and across
the public-private divide.145
Information-sharing networks do not, however, consistently appear
when trade secret protection is low or non-existent. Indeed some empirical
studies have reached the opposite conclusion. For example, Mark Lemley
has further developed and expanded the incentive theory of trade secrets.146
Lemley agrees with Landes and Posner that trade secret law prevents overinvestment in keeping information secret.147 Lemley bolsters his argument
by citing to empirical evidence of the “draconian limits on the mobility of
employees and the development of competing firms” imposed by the guild
system, and of high investment in self-help measures in countries that do not
provide protection for trade secrets.148
The problem, then, is to figure out which contexts create innovation
networks and which give rise to wasteful self-help efforts. Taken together,
knowledge network studies show that lack of trade secret protection will lead
142 See supra Sections I.A, I.B.
143 See Allen, supra note 5; Nuvolari, supra note 5.
144 See Allen, supra note 5, at 2–3; Nuvolari, supra note 5, at 348–49.
145 See Philip Cooke, Biotechnology Clusters as Regional, Sectoral Innovation Systems, 25 INT’L
REGIONAL SCI. REV. 8, 8 (2002) (discussing how “[b]iotechnology is a knowledge-driven
sector” which results in “firms cluster[ing] in proximity to knowledge sources”); Philip
Cooke, Regional Innovation Systems: General Findings and Some New Evidence from Biotechnology
Clusters, 27 J. TECH. TRANSFER 133, 133 (2002) (showing that “regional and external innovation interaction among firms and other innovation organizations is important for regional
innovation potential”); see also supra Section I.B.
146 See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61
STAN. L. REV. 311, 329–38 (2008).
147 See Lemley, supra note 65, at 334.
148 Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-4\NDL406.txt

1586

unknown

Seq: 26

notre dame law review

3-MAY-17

16:15

[vol. 92:4

to openness rather than to excessive efforts at secrecy when the following
conditions have been met: (1) the innovation at issue is complex (where
technological progress is rapid and knowledge is widely dispersed among
firms); and (2) the innovators belong to a background epistemic community
with social norms of open-sharing (often affiliated with a university that
anchors a technology cluster) and share local social ties.
One important counterargument to the prescription to weaken trade
secret protection in these industries must be addressed first: If certain industries tend to form innovation clusters instead of relying on self-help measures
in the absence of trade secrets, would it not make little difference to those
industries whether trade secrets are available? In other words, one could
argue that trade secrets have no effect in industries that are likely to form
networks, while a positive, innovation-enhancing effect in other industries
where lack of trade secret protection is likely to result in wasteful self-help
efforts. As a consequence, the argument goes, research on knowledge networks can tell us little about how to design trade secret law. But this argument is misguided. The availability and strength of trade secret protection
will invariably alter the calculus of firms when deciding whether to allow or
prevent information sharing by their employees, and may tip the balance
towards secrecy.
Recall that both historical and empirical studies on knowledge networks
show an underlying tension between managers’ and inventors’ background
social norms and incentives regarding informal know-how sharing.149 Quite
remarkably, in each one of the case studies surveyed above—both during the
Industrial Revolution and in modern biotechnology and software engineering clusters—the scientists involved directly in innovation belonged to epistemic communities that crossed firm boundaries and favored open sharing.150
In both historical and present-day innovation clusters, innovators engaged in
informal information sharing in no small part because they held a joint interest in advancing a technological frontier.151 When inventors are part of epistemic communities whose social norms favor openness and information
sharing, and instill in their members individual interests in the overall
advancement of a particular technological frontier, inventors within individual firms have a tendency for reciprocal informational exchange across firms.
In contrast, managers preferred trade secrets to protect technological
know-how, even when reciprocal sharing may well have been to the advantage of their individual firms.152 These historical and empirical studies
149 See supra Sections I.B, I.C.
150 See Allen, supra note 5, at 16–21 (discussing the development of epistemic communities during the Industrial Revolution); Powell et al., supra note 2, at 117 (discussing collaboration in the field of biotechnology).
151 See Powell & Giannella, supra note 2, at 5.
152 In the aggregate, network studies strongly suggest that in complex industries overall
productivity and social welfare increases when information is shared and created in networks. See Allen, supra note 5, at 21; Nuvolari, supra note 5, at 356–57; Podolny & Page,
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report managers’ reluctance to share information but do not analyze why this
may be the case. There are two possible reasons for managers’ behavior.
First, managers (and firms) face well-known coordination problems.153
Although facilitating informal know-how sharing may be in the collective
interest of all firms in the region, it is in the interest of any one firm to defect
from cooperation, provided all other firms behave cooperatively. Defecting
firms will get the benefits of informational spillovers from other firms while
succeeding in keeping internally produced information secret. Thus, absent
some coordinating mechanism, beneficial collaboration will not take place.
Social norms of reciprocal open-sharing and self-monitoring that emerge in
epistemic communities in effect provide one such coordinating mechanism.
But, from the perspective of managers, this coordinating mechanism, and in
particular the myriad informal exchanges among inventors, will be hard to
monitor.154
Second, research suggests that managers are more likely than inventors
to overvalue internally produced information,155 and to exhibit short-term
bias.156 These preferences are in sharp contrast to inventors’ joint interest in
the collective success and advancement of a particular technological
frontier.157
In this context, the strength of trade secret protection will influence
whose preferences will win out, with high trade secret protection favoring
managers’ preferences and low trade secret protection those of inventors.158
From a public policy perspective (looking to maximize overall social
benefit), however, legal interventions should seek to increase the formation
supra note 43, at 62–66; Powell et al., supra note 2, at 142–43; Wray, supra note 82, at
156–58.
153 See Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 3 (describing instances in which social forces will
prevent productive collaboration); Andrew Schrank & Josh Whitford, The Anatomy of Network Failure, 29 SOC. THEORY 151, 153 (2011) (analyzing the reasons for network failure).
See generally Fleming et al., supra note 77 (discussing the factors that inhibit the formation
of aggregation and regional inventor networks); Gilson supra note 27, at 596.
154 Other coordination mechanisms include formal contractual agreements across firm
boundaries, such as joint venture or joint R&D agreements. But the relatively small value
of any one piece of technological know-how and the difficulties inherent in monitoring
know-how transfers make the transaction costs of setting up a formal collaboration for
technical know-how exchange very high. See von Hippel supra note 5, at 300 (“Informal
know-how trading . . . has a lower transaction cost than more formal agreements to license
or sell similar information. Transaction costs in informal know-how trading systems are
low because decisions to trade or not trade proprietary know-how are made by individual,
knowledgeable engineers.”).
155 See, e.g., Fleming et al., supra note 77, at 521, 539 (“[M]anagement thought we had
all these great secrets to conceal; the engineers knew that the value was in collaboration.”).
156 See David B. Balkin, Gideon D. Markman & Luis R. Gomez-Mejia, Is CEO Pay in
High-Technology Firms Related to Innovation? 43 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1118 (2000).
157 See supra Section I.C.
158 See, e.g., Fleming et al., supra note 77, at 538–39 (discussing how “[inventors’] stories described an effort to evade efforts by management to contain their boundary-crossing
collaborations”).
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of knowledge networks (or clusters) in technological frontiers where innovation is complex.159 In these types of industries, and because of managerial
preferences, strong trade secret protection is likely to have just the opposite
effect.160
To develop this point further, it is helpful to explore the likely effect of
strong and weak trade secret protection on the incentive structure of managers, considering also the underlying (and differing) incentive structure of
inventors. Two types of scenarios are possible. First, in the “traditional” case
often described in utilitarian analyses of trade secret protection, employees
are assumed to act purely in their self-interests, which can lead to opportunistic behavior (reflecting typical principal/agent problems).161 Second, in the
cases of successful innovation clusters I have examined in this Article, inventors are embedded in an epistemic community that cuts across individual
firms—with norms of reciprocity and open-sharing, and thick local social ties.
These inventors also work in complex industries, with fast-moving technological frontiers where relevant knowledge is widely dispersed across firms. Thus,
in these successful clusters, inventors have a particular set of incentives that
differ from those of managers, but also differ from those of the opportunistic
self-interested inventor of the first scenario. In both cases I assume that managers have a preference or bias for keeping internal information secret and
for potentially overvaluing internally produced information.
Inventors in innovation clusters are motivated by their epistemic community norms to share information openly and reciprocally with other community members. They are also driven by a personal desire—likely nurtured
by epistemic community membership—to solve problems in and advance the
frontiers of a particular technological field.162 Both of these incentives can
conflict with manager-specific preferences for keeping internal discoveries
secret. But it is the differences between the opportunistic, self-interested
inventor and the epistemic-community inventor that will influence the
impact of strong trade secret protection on overall social utility.
There are therefore two possible scenarios. In the first scenario, when
inventors are not constrained by social norms of reciprocal open-sharing, or
by a common interest in advancing a technological frontier, there is a good
159 See sources cited supra note 120 (emphasizing the overall advantages for technological progress in complex industries of informal knowledge flows through local networks).
One potential concern is that knowledge networks, by encouraging firms to pool their
resources and share any resulting technology, can ultimately have anti-competitive effects.
Concerns about anti-competitive effects, however, are mitigated when firms pool complementary technological know-how, as is often the case in these complex industries. Indeed,
antitrust authorities generally find these types of collaborative arrangements pro-competitive. See DOJ/FTC ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATION AMONG COMPETITORS at 1
(“[C]ollaborations [among competitors] often are not only benign but procompetitive.”).
160 See, e.g., ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF
A HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET 27–40 (2003).
161 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, 14 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 57 (1989).
162 See Fleming et al., supra note 77, at 539; Powell & Giannella, supra note 2, at 5.
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argument that strong trade secret protection that prevents informal knowhow exchange across firm boundaries can have an overall positive social
impact.163 Managers are likely to rely on and enforce strong trade secret laws
to prevent inventors from taking critical know-how with them when departing for competing firms (or from sharing such critical know-how while
employed at the firm for personal benefit). As a consequence, inventors will
be less likely to engage in this opportunistic behavior to begin with and managers less likely to overinvest in inefficient self-help measures such as
enhanced security measures and selective or fragmented disclosure of sensitive information to employees.
In this first scenario—the case of the opportunistic employee-inventor—
weak or nonexistent trade secret protection will in turn enhance self-help
measures by managers to prevent inventors’ likely opportunistic behavior.
Crucially, in this first scenario, there is no reciprocal exchange of information, no creation of new knowledge in the process of informal informational
exchange and collaboration across firm boundaries, and no clustering of
innovation.164
In contrast to scenario one, information exchange occurs reciprocally
through an epistemic network in scenario two. Network members share the
goal of pooling widely dispersed but complementary expertise to solve a complex technological problem or advance a technological frontier. The social
gains of such informal information exchange are much clearer, and so are
the social costs of preventing it. On balance, therefore, trade secret law
should not be deployed to prevent this type of reciprocal information
exchange.165 Let us examine, however, the likely outcome of the availability
of either strong or weak trade secret protection in scenario two.
When trade secret protection is strong, managers (who have a preference for maintaining secrecy and eschewing informal information
exchanges) are likely to deploy trade secret law to chill the formation of
163 See, e.g., Gillian Lester, Restrictive Covenants, Employee Training, and the Limits of Transaction-Cost Analysis, 76 IND. L.J. 49 (2001). But see Lobel, supra note 27, at 845–46 (“The
long-unchallenged assumption has been that human capital controls are necessary because
otherwise employers would underinvest in employee training. In other words, the move
toward cognitive property is necessary to incentivize corporate investment. Under the
traditional analysis, externalities are a type of market failure. Just as tort liability aims to
internalize negative externalities—the harm to others—knowledge monopolies are viewed
as necessary to internalize positive externalities—or spillovers—that flow from innovation.”
(footnotes omitted)).
164 Of course, information flow can be reciprocal if firms share labor pools and if inventors routinely move from one firm to another, taking important know-how to competitors.
Still, in this case, one does not get a network effect, which happens when inventors that
stay in a given firm collaborate on a joint project across boundaries with inventors who—
because they are embedded in different business practices and routines—bring a different
perspective to the problem at hand. See, e.g., Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 3 (describing sociological research on boundary-crossing and innovation).
165 To be clear, the studies described in this Article suggest, but do not conclusively
show, that social welfare would be enhanced if some types of informal information sharing
were allowed to proceed unencumbered by manager opposition.
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informal information-exchange networks.166 By strong trade secret protection, I mean, for example, a broad scope of the type of information that is
considered a trade secret; a high implicit duty of confidentiality that attaches
to all employees; routine grants of injunctive relief or high damage awards;
endorsement of the inevitable disclosure doctrine; and enforcement of the
related doctrine of post-employment covenants not to compete.167
When trade secret protection is weak, managers have two options. First,
they can choose to increase self-help measures to prevent employee disclosure. But the effectiveness of self-help measures such as enhanced security
and information fragmentation is greatly diminished when employees are
part of the same epistemic community in a local innovation cluster. In these
communities, information has a tendency to leak out. In contrast to the
effectiveness of legal sanctions (through trade secret and non-compete protection), which deter both employees from sharing information across
boundaries and firms from hiring competing firms’ employees (lest they be
embroiled in trade secret litigation), maintaining secrecy through private
means is likely to be a very costly and ultimately fruitless endeavor. Second,
managers can choose to adapt to inventors’ information-sharing social norms
by developing a networked organizational structure. This appears to be what
happened in several Silicon Valley firms where a hybrid public/private set of
social norms that favored the open sharing of some forms of information
across firms slowly emerged.168
Of course, in the absence of both transaction costs and asymmetric
information between parties, whether trade secret law is aligned with managers’ or inventor-employees’ preferences will not matter. Managers and their
employees will be able to bargain for their preferred arrangement. In other
words, trade secret law acts as a default rule. But the real-world employment
contexts described in this Article depart in one important way from this
ideal, frictionless scenario. Firms and managers—as repeat players in negotiating employment contracts—are likely to possess superior information
regarding the content of background trade secret laws that serve as default
rules. If this is the case, setting default trade secret law to favor the preferences of employee-inventors rather than managers enhances efficiency by
acting as what Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner have termed a “penalty
default.”169
166 See, e.g., Fleming et al., supra note 77, at 521, 540 (“Willingness to share information
appears to be more strongly correlated with a managerial versus technical profession than
with location.”); Oliver & Liebeskind, supra note 95; Waltz, supra note 118, at 880; Wright
& Wallace, supra note 118.
167 See discussion infra Section III.A.
168 See SAXENIAN, supra note 77, at 35; Gilson, supra note 27, at 596 (describing how
early in Silicon Valley’s development “employers responded to departing employees by
taking legal action,” and how “[o]nly the failure of these efforts led to employer acceptance of high velocity employment.”).
169 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 97 (1989). Penalty defaults give the most informed party to a
transaction (here, firms) an incentive to contract around the default. In so doing, they
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Fragmentation of Scientific and Technological Research and
Underinvestment in Employee Training

The second predicted consequence of no (or weak) trade secret protection is the fragmentation of scientific knowledge due to selective revealing of
trade secrets by firms to their inventors. In regions characterized by clustering and knowledge networks, however, the opposite was true. In fact, a hallmark of these regions is the fluid exchange and recombination of know-how
among members of particular epistemic communities. There are two interconnected explanations for this. First, the strong pull of social norms of reciprocity and openness in epistemic communities of inventors, combined with
inventors’ shared interest in advancing a particular technology, pushes
against fragmentation and likely overcomes coordination problems among
inventors. Second, realizing that preventing information sharing and pooling by their own employees is both costly and fruitless, firms in these complex and fast-moving industries likely do not attempt a knowledgefragmentation strategy. This is in contrast with firms in more stable and less
complex industries, where knowledge fragmentation is a viable and often
used self-help strategy. For example, Coca-Cola is well known in the industry
for making sure that only two employees at a time are aware of the full CocaCola formula.170
Finally, employee-inventor learning happens at breakneck speed in
knowledge networks. Such learning is facilitated—rather than hampered—
by the formation of local networks of information sharing. Learning that
takes place in networks is also qualitatively different from learning that happens within firm boundaries. Interaction in networks combines both diversity and trust—two key ingredients for breakthrough innovation.171 Diversity
arises from contrasting firm cultures and routines. Trust emerges from membership in the same epistemic community. In this context, it matters less
whether firms themselves underinvest in training—although interview data
incentivize firms and managers to release specific information to employee-inventors about
their preferences regarding technical know-how exchanges. By making these preferences
explicit, a penalty default rule would put future employee-inventors on notice that the
information sharing practices they may take for granted in their epistemic communities
are no longer viable in this particular firm environment. Id.
170 See William Lee Adams, Is This the Real Thing? Coca-Cola’s Secret Formula ‘Discovered’,
TIME (Feb. 15, 2011), http://newsfeed.time.com/2011/02/15/is-this-the-real-thing-cocacolas-secret-formula-discovered/.
171 See, e.g., Mathijs de Vaan, David Stark & Balázs Vedres, Game Changer: The Topology of
Creativity, 120 AM. J. SOC. 1144 (2015) (arguing that groups with diverse cultural elements
but overlapping membership are creativity-enhancing); Pedraza-Fariña, supra note 3 (synthesizing network research on the effects of diversity and trust on creativity and innovative
output); Balázs Vedres & David Stark, Structural Folds: Generative Disruption in Overlapping
Groups, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1150, 1151 (2010) (“[E]ntrepreneurship in the business-group context is driven by the intersection of cohesive groups where actors have familiar access to
diverse resources available for recombination.”).
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from biotechnology and IT clusters suggests that firms do continue investing
in training.172
What are the implications of these findings for trade secret doctrine? In
industries where weak trade secret protection would lead to the creation of
innovation networks, the benefits of strong trade secrets evaporate and we
are left only with its costs to information diffusion. As Robert Bone
remarked, some types of innovation “might be better off in an environment
where information is shared rather than kept secret.”173 Economic and network sociologists have now amassed a significant amount of data showing
precisely what types of innovations would be better off when information is
openly shared. They are those that combine (1) complex innovation (fastpaced and with widely distributed knowledge across firms); with (2) an epistemic community with social norms of reciprocal open-sharing and thick
local ties (often anchored by a university).
One may question, however, the feasibility of tailoring trade secret protection to fit the needs of particular industries. The next Part explores two
related avenues for doing this. It first sketches several doctrinal entry-points
where courts can incorporate contextual considerations of the value of informal networks. It then considers the advantages of state variation versus federal homogenization. A full exploration of the doctrinal consequences of
informal networks, including an in-depth analysis of the interplay between
federal and state trade secret protection, is beyond the scope of this Article.
The next Part, however, begins this conversation.
III.

IMPLICATIONS
A.

FOR

TRADE SECRET LAW DOCTRINE

State Trade Secret Law

Until the passage of the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) in 2016,174
which created a federal cause of action for trade secret misappropriation,
trade secrets were largely a creature of state law. Because most states have
adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA),175 the contours of trade
secret doctrine are fairly homogeneous across states—although there remain
important differences among states in key doctrines.176 This Section focuses
on four such doctrines where, I argue, state-by-state variation tailored to local
industry characteristics is desirable. The four doctrines are: (1) scope of
172 See, e.g., Fleming et al., supra note 77.
173 Robert G. Bone, The (Still) Shaky Foundations of Trade Secret Law, 92 TEX. L. REV.
1803, 1814 (2014).
174 Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.).
175 As of May 2013, the UTSA has been enacted by forty-seven states, and by the District
of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. See Legislative Fact Sheet - Trade Secrets
Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=
Trade%20Secrets%20Act (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
176 These differences are particularly salient when one compares the law on the books
versus the law as applied. While trade secret law doctrine can look quite similar on the
books, its application is much less homogeneous. See infra Section III.B.
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information that qualifies as general skill and knowledge versus trade secret;
(2) scope of an employee’s implicit duty of loyalty; (3) covenants not to compete; and (4) the inevitable disclosure doctrine.
According to the UTSA, a trade secret may consist of:
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not
being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of
efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy.177
Crucially, however, not all secret information qualifies as a trade secret:
an individual may use the “general skill and knowledge” acquired during his
or her employment freely.178 Therefore, determining the line between what
constitutes a trade secret and what is part of an inventor’s general skill and
knowledge influences the scope of trade secret protection. This potential
doctrinal lever could restrict the scope of trade secret protection in complex
industries with background epistemic communities. I examine how we may
narrow the scope of trade secret protection through this doctrinal lever
below.
If a trade secret is “misappropriated,” or obtained by “improper means,”
the trade secret holder may seek civil remedies including an injunction, compensatory damages, and, in cases of bad faith or willful and malicious misappropriation, “exemplary” damages and reasonable attorneys’ fees.179
“Improper means” are generally acts that give rise to separate causes of
action under tort or criminal statutes, such as “theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or
espionage through electronic or other means.”180 Courts have read into the
employer-employee relationship a broad implied duty of loyalty and confidence on the part of employees. Breach of such implicit duty of loyalty and
confidence also constitutes trade secret misappropriation, even in the
177 UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1(4) (Nat’l Conference of
Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws 1985) [hereinafter UTSA].
178 See, e.g., SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244 (3d Cir. 1985) (“Under
Pennsylvania law an employee’s general knowledge, skill, and experience are not trade
secrets. Thus in theory an employer generally may not inhibit the manner in which an
employee uses his or her knowledge, skill, and experience—even if these were acquired
during employment.” (citation omitted)).
179 UTSA §§ 1(2)(i), 2–3.
180 Id. § 1(1). Improper means can encompass conduct that is otherwise lawful,
although the vast majority of trade secret cases concern conduct that violates another tort
or criminal statute. The canonical case E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d
1012 (5th Cir. 1970), held “improper means” could expand beyond conduct proscribed in
tort or criminal statutes. In E.I. duPont deNemours, the court found the use of an airplane
over an unfinished duPont plant to determine its layout to constitute improper means. See
id. at 1015.
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absence of an explicit agreement spelling out the contours of such duty.181
The wide reach of the duty of loyalty and confidence, however, can have an
important chilling effect on the type of inter-firm information-sharing activities described in Sections I.B and I.C. I examine the impact of the duty of
loyalty and confidence on the formation of information-sharing networks
below.
Firms are often especially concerned about trade secret misappropriation in the context of employee migration to competing firms or to form
start-ups. To prevent information sharing by departing employees, firms will
often require employees to sign covenants not to compete, i.e., agreements
to refrain from employment that competes with the employer’s business for a
certain period of time.182 The main justification for enforcing covenants not
to compete is the protection of employer trade secrets. States vary widely on
their policies regarding non-competes, with California having adopted strong
policies against enforcing contractual restrictions on employee mobility and
other states taking a contrary approach.183
One particular trade secret doctrine, the inevitable disclosure doctrine,
has emerged as a strong bulwark against the potential disclosure of trade
secrets by employees who go on to work for competing firms (or who start
their own competing venture). In its strong form, the inevitable disclosure
doctrine enjoins employees from working for competing firms if they would
inevitably disclose trade secrets in the course of employment—obviating the
need for proof of actual disclosure by the departing employee.184 In fact, the
inevitable disclosure doctrine “gives the former employer the benefit of a
covenant not to compete without actually having entered into one.”185 Once
again, states have taken diverse positions on inevitable disclosure: neither
California nor Massachusetts recognize inevitable disclosure as a viable theory of liability, while Illinois’ courts have been more receptive to the
doctrine.186
Covenants not to compete and the inevitable disclosure doctrine can
have a chilling effect on employee migration. Because employee migration is
strongly associated with the formation of local information-sharing networks,
these two doctrines can also have a negative impact on the formation of
knowledge networks.187 The next subsections briefly analyze these four doc181 See, e.g., Peter C. Quittmeyer, Trade Secrets and Confidential Information Under Georgia
Law, 19 GA. L. REV. 623, 665–66 (1985) (discussing the implied duty of confidentiality in
Georgia); Sharon K. Sandeen, Relative Privacy: What Privacy Advocates Can Learn from Trade
Secret Law, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 667, 699; Lars S. Smith, Trade Secrets in Commercial Transactions and Bankruptcy, 40 IDEA 549, 552 (2000).
182 See Covenant Not To Compete, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
183 See infra Section III.B. In all states, however, covenants not to compete must be
“reasonable” in order to be enforceable. See, e.g., Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 114.
184 See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Rowe, When Trade Secrets Become Shackles: Fairness and the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 7 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 167 (2005).
185 See Fisk, supra note 27, at 507.
186 See James A. Johnson, Keeping Your Secrets Secret, 87 N.Y. ST. B.J. 24, 25–26 (2015).
187 See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 27, at 825–35.
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trines and their influence on the formation of knowledge networks and propose modifications that take into account the characteristics of industries
where knowledge networks are innovation-enhancing.
1.

General Skill and Knowledge vs. Trade Secret Information

A fundamental set of countervailing public policies guides state law in
establishing the dividing line between general skill and knowledge and trade
secrets: the protection of business interests from unfair competition, on the
one hand, and the public interest in labor mobility leading to “competition
and the dissemination of ideas, which in turn benefit the consumer” on the
other.188
Courts have recognized that the scope of what constitutes background
skills and knowledge may be broader in high-technology industries. For
example, the Third Circuit has noted that in “newer, high-technology industries,” the attributes of the employee “are inextricably related to the information or process that constitutes an employer’s competitive advantage.”189 In
these cases, the court argues, “the legal questions confronting the court necessarily become bound up with competing public policies.”190 Such public
policy considerations include allocating “resources of skill and information . . . in such a manner that they are utilized most efficiently to produce
goods and services.”191 This public policy of efficient resource and information allocation provides a justification for narrowing the type of information
that is considered a trade secret in complex fields with a background epistemic community. More specifically, it provides a justification for considering
the type of technical know-how that is routinely informally exchanged in
these industries (negative know-how, i.e., details about what does not work to
solve a problem, and know-how regarding details about public experimental
protocols) a part of an employee’s general background knowledge.192
In fact, it appears that some states have taken the view that negative
know-how constitutes general skill and knowledge (and falls outside trade
secret protection), albeit not explicitly. For example, in EarthWeb, Inc. v.
Schlack, the court found that under New York law an employee’s “awareness
188 SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1268 (3d Cir. 1985).
189 Id. at 1267.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 1268.
192 See Tempo Instrument, Inc. v. Logitek, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 1, 3 (E.D.N.Y. 1964) (“The
court is of the opinion that this know-how, alleged to have been disclosed to the defendant
Fischer in a confidential relationship and then wrongly utilized by him, constitutes nothing
more than the general knowledge and experience gained by an employee in any business
and is, therefore, not actionable.”); Robert Denicola, The Restatements, the Uniform Act and
the Status of American Trade Secret Law, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 18, 25 (tracing the history of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and explaining how it expanded the definition of trade secrets to
include “negative” information—“knowledge that certain processes or methods will not
work.”).
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of the trial and error process that [his employer] undertook in implementing
the products and services of outside consultants” did not “rise to the status of
a trade secret.”193 Significantly, the court found unpersuasive the employer
EarthWeb’s arguments that its former employee’s awareness of such trial and
error process would impermissibly allow him to “avoid the mistakes that
EarthWeb made in the past” when solving similar problems for a competitor.194 Awareness of trial and error processes is simply an awareness of what
doesn’t work, i.e., negative know-how as defined in this Article.
2.

Duty of Loyalty and Duty of Confidence

Trade secret doctrine “accepts as given that employment is a relationship of ‘trust and confidence’ that obligates the employee to keep some
information secret,” even in the absence of an explicit contractual agreement
to do so.195 But this broad interpretation of the implicit duties inherent in
any employer-employee relationship is not in alignment with the practices
and understandings of high-technology inventors in the innovation clusters
surveyed in this Article. Indeed, biotechnology companies seem to recognize
this gap—several articles in biotechnology publications feature attorneys dispensing advice to companies on how to rid their employees of their opensharing ethos.196 Courts’ understanding of such a broad implicit duty of
confidentiality constitutes a strong trade secret norm.197 For the reasons outlined in subsection I.B.1 these background rules of strict confidentiality that
discourage interaction across firm boundaries, however, are likely to have a
chilling effect on the socially beneficial practices of open-sharing described
in Part I.
Why have courts adopted such an understanding of the background
duties of employees towards their employers? As Catherine Fisk shows in her
historical study of the emergence of trade secret law, this implicit duty of
loyalty and confidence is a relatively new doctrinal development.198 Furthermore, this development is not grounded in careful policy analysis regarding
what background rule most efficiently promotes innovation, or other societal
goals or values. Rather, it emerged gradually from the expansion to all
193 EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 305, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
194 Id. at 305.
195 Fisk, supra note 27, at 452.
196 See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 118, at 293 (“Often informal, biotech companies tend to
draw employees from academia, where advancement and reputation are built on publication, not secrecy. Such employees must be schooled to avoid disclosure at trade conferences or in presentations or papers, and to understand that the innovations they work on
are their employer’s property, to publicize or withhold as it sees fit.” (footnote omitted));
Waltz, supra note 118; Wright & Wallace, supra note 118.
197 See, e.g., Fisk, supra note 27 (showing the gradual expansion of the implicit duty of
loyalty in employee-employer relationships).
198 See id. at 452–53 (“In 1800, trade secret doctrine as such did not exist. Only some
employment relations were characterized as confidential and, therefore, incorporated an
obligation not to divulge workplace secrets. . . . Skilled workers would have been bound by
none of these obligations.”).
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employment relationships of two bodies of law—master-servant and agency—
that were originally narrowly applied to a subset of work relationships.199
Until the early 1900s, outside of master-servant and agency relationships, the
basis for confidentiality was grounded in express contracts.200 And the scope
of the information protected by trade secrets remained relatively narrow—
confined to tangible things such as drawings (and certainly excluding negative knowledge).201
This transition from relying on express contracts to set out the extent of
employees’ duties to reading an implied duty of confidence and loyalty into
all employment relationships reflected a conceptual shift in how courts interpreted workplace knowledge.202 Such knowledge increasingly came to be
seen as the property of firms, rather than the background skill and technical
knowledge of individual inventors, which they could freely exchange and disclose.203 But when important knowledge is generated in informal collaboration networks that cross firm boundaries, this strong norm that treats an ever
expanding amount of knowledge as originating within and belonging to individual firms can be counter-productive for overall innovation. It is also out of
tune with innovation-enhancing practices of research clusters.
Two important corrections to how courts interpret employees’ duties of
confidentiality and loyalty can help better align legal rules and innovation
incentives, and complement my earlier proposal to expand what constitutes
“general skill and knowledge” in these industries. First, in both master-servant law and agency, the policy reason underlying the duty of loyalty and
confidence is to prevent opportunistic behavior.204 When there is reciprocal
exchange across firms through epistemic networks, there is no such opportunistic behavior. Rather, innovation in networks involves a process of collective learning that benefits the entire innovation cluster. Second, two crucial
elements of know-how that are often only exchanged (and available) informally are (1) negative know-how—information about what does not work to

199 See id. at 450–53.
200 See id. at 492 (emphasizing that the duty to keep secrets “was grounded in express
contract or in a traditionally confidential relationship like that of attorney and client; it did
not arise simply from the fact of employment”).
201 See id. at 492–93.
202 See id. at 498–503.
203 See Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v. Dodds, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 154, 158 (Super. Ct.
1887) (“I am inclined to think that his obligation to preserve such secret as the property of
his employer must be implied, even though nothing was said to him on the subject.”); see
also Fisk, supra note 27, at 504 (“What changed over the century was not the judicial ability
to imagine the economic value of all the knowledge and experience of a skilled workman
or plant superintendent but the judicial ability to imagine such knowledge as the exclusive
property of a firm.”).
204 See HORACE GAY WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 225 (2d ed.
1886) (discussing an implied duty of confidentiality that prevents an employee from making “any attempt on his part to use the secret for his own interests against the master”).
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solve a particular problem205—and (2) details regarding how to get publicly
available protocols to work.206
These findings dictate an important correction to courts’ current interpretations of employees’ implicit duties regarding the exchange of technological know-how. In the absence of an express contract governing
employment relationships, courts should take a contextual, case-by-case view
of employee duties—rather than imply a blanket duty of confidentiality to all
employer-employee relationships. In particular, in defining whether there is
an implied duty of loyalty and confidence and in ascertaining its scope,
courts should take into account the background norms in specific industries,
in particular whether particular informational exchanges are reciprocal,
occur in innovation clusters, and occur through an epistemic network that
cuts across firm boundaries. If these three conditions are met, the implied
duty of loyalty and confidence should be interpreted very narrowly to apply
only to non-reciprocal acts of opportunistic behavior on the part of employees, and to exclude reciprocal exchanges of negative know-how and knowledge about how to perform publicly available protocols.
Tailoring the implied contract rule to the actual information-exchange
practices in particular innovation communities may push employers to sign
205 See, e.g., Natalie Matosin et al., Negativity Towards Negative Results: A Discussion of the
Disconnect Between Scientific Worth and Scientific Culture, 7 DISEASE MODELS & MECHANISMS 171
(2014) (discussing the difficulties in communicating negative results through printed
media); Jonathan Schooler, Unpublished Results Hide the Decline Effect, NATURE (2011), http:/
/www.nature.com/news/2011/110223/full/470437a.html.
206 Experimental protocols are generally publicly available either through publication
in the “Materials and Methods” section of scientific or trade journals, or by publication in a
patent specification or disclosure. It is exceedingly common, however, for researchers to
be unable to replicate an experimental protocol simply by looking at the published set of
instructions. Informal exchanges among researchers are the most common way to address
this problem. See, e.g., Jocelyn Kaiser, The Cancer Test, SCI., June 26, 2015, at 1411, 1413
(“Amassing all the information needed to replicate an experiment . . . proved more complex and time-consuming than we ever imagined [because] . . . [p]rincipal investigators
had to dig up notebooks and raw data files and track down long-gone postdocs and graduate students.” (quoting a leading scientist on his efforts to replicate experiments in cancer
biology)); Brian A. Nosek & Timothy M. Errington, Reproducibility in Cancer Biology: Making
Sense of Replication, ELIFE (Jan. 19, 2017), https://elifesciences.org/content/6/e23383.
The efforts described in these two publications are part of the Reproducibility Initiative—
which seeks to replicate results in prominent cancer biology papers. The Reproducibility
Initiative got its start after publications by two pharmaceutical companies, Amgen and
Bayer, claimed that only eleven and twenty-one percent, respectively, of prominent cancer
biology studies could be replicated. Unsurprisingly in the context of this article, the two
study authors who worked at Amgen and Bayer could not divulge which particular studies
they had been unable to replicate: they had signed confidentiality agreements with these
two pharmaceutical companies that prevented them from divulging this “negative knowhow.” Kaiser, supra, at 1412; see also C. Glenn Begley & Lee M. Ellis, Drug Development: Raise
Standards for Preclinical Cancer Research, 483 NATURE 531 (2012) (reporting the results of the
Amgen studies); Florian Prinz et al., Believe It or Not: How Much Can We Rely on Published
Data on Potential Drug Targets?, 10 NATURE REV. 712 (2011) (reporting the results of the
Bayer studies).
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express contracts with their employees outlining their expectations regarding
information exchange.207 If managers’ expectations differ widely from those
of the innovator communities—as was the case in the innovation clusters surveyed here—this will prompt a confrontation between background opensharing norms and express expectations of secrecy. It will also, as predicted
in theoretical models of trade secrets outlined in Part II, increase managers’
efforts to control information exchange through other self-help measures.
The outcome of such confrontation depends in large part on the strength of
the background norms of the epistemic inventor community.208
3.

Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine and Covenants not to Compete

In this Article, I have emphasized the importance of networks of interindustry information exchange in advancing innovation in complex industries. Previous research on trade secrets and related doctrines, such as covenants not to compete and non-solicitation agreements, has focused largely on
the role and importance of employee migration to competing firms for overall innovation.209 This focus has been driven by the conclusion that information dissemination in successful industrial clusters takes place largely through
employee migration.210 In this model, employee migration generates important knowledge spillovers as employees transfer ideas and crucial know-how
to other local firms.
Although employee migration to competing firms is undoubtedly important for innovation in clusters, this Article emphasizes an equally important,
yet underexplored, source of information diffusion in technology clusters:
reciprocal information exchange across firm boundaries through networks of
employees who collaborate while employed at competing firms.211 In fact,
many of the collaborations that are hailed as having fueled Silicon Valley’s
early success are inter-firm collaborations between IBM and several other
Silicon Valley firms.212
207 See, e.g., Harley & Lund Corp. v. Murray Rubber Co., 31 F.2d 932, 934 (2d Cir. 1929)
(“[T]ime creates no prescriptive right in other men’s labor. If an employer expects so
much, he must secure it by contract.”).
208 Apple’s recent decision to allow its artificial intelligence and machine learning people to publish some of their results is an example of how the clash between managers’ and
inventors’ background social norms and interests regarding disclosure may lead to a
change in company policy. John Gruber, Apple’s AI Team Publishes First Research Paper, DARING FIREBALL (Dec. 26, 2016), http://daringfireball.net/linked/2016/12/26/apple-ai-re
search-paper.
209 See, e.g., LOBEL, supra note 27, at 49–57; Catherine Fisk, Taking the Long View on
Competition and the Mobile Employee: Lessons from the United States History of Efforts to Regulate
Employee Innovation and the Mobility of Workplace Knowledge, in BUSINESS INNOVATION AND THE
LAW: PERSPECTIVES FROM INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, LABOUR, COMPETITION AND CORPORATE
LAW 214 (Marilyn Pittard et al. eds., 2013) [hereinafter Fisk, Taking the Long View]; Fisk,
supra note 27; Fisk & Barry, supra note 27; Gilson, supra note 27; Lobel, supra note 27.
210 See supra note 22.
211 See supra Sections I.B, I.C.
212 See supra Sections I.B, I.C.
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Moreover, the reasons why employee migration can be innovationenhancing also remain underdeveloped. Employees are not simply vessels
for the flow of know-how, although this is certainly one of the functions of
employee mobility. Rather, employee migration is also important because it
enables the creation of bonds of trust across firms, which subsequently
enable informal information exchanges.213 Employees who previously
worked together for a single firm can develop the necessary level of trust to
continue collaborating across firm boundaries when they migrate to competing firms. This dynamic is in fact what facilitated collaboration in the Silicon
Valley cluster.214 Both the Silicon Valley and Boston clusters saw a high
amount of collaboration—driven by belonging to the same epistemic community of researchers trained by universities.215 But Silicon Valley experienced a much higher amount of inter-firm collaboration than Boston
because of a single institutional post-doctoral program hosted by IBM.216
That program trained post-doctoral fellows who went on to work for other
firms but stayed in touch with each other. In other words, the post-doctoral
program created links of trust among its participants that carried over to
employment in other firms. Indeed, many of the collaborations that are
hailed as having fueled Silicon Valley’s success are inter-industry collaborations that sprang from IBM’s postdoctoral program.217 At the time, IBM
held an unusual managerial attitude towards employee migration: viewing
the IBM postdoctoral program as a tool to spread the “IBM way” across a
variety of firms.218 The same is true of the San Diego cluster. Employees
from the failed diagnostics company Hybritech stayed in the San Diego area
and went on to found start-ups that routinely exchanged information and
collaborated with each other—in large part because of having previously
worked together at Hybritech.219
How should this second role of employee migration—enhancing the
local reservoir of trust across firms in innovation clusters—inform courts’
treatment of the inevitable disclosure doctrine and the enforceability of covenants not to compete? In essence, appreciating the importance of migration
for trust-building uncovers an additional benefit to the free circulation of
human capital.
First, the inevitable disclosure doctrine can chill local employee migration. It is, in the language used in Part II, a strong trade secret protection
213 See supra Section I.B, I.C; see also Fleming et al., supra note 77, at 537 (“IBM assumed
that [members of its post-doctoral program] would depart as ambassadors for the firm.”).
214 Fleming et al., supra note 77; Fleming & Frenken, supra note 8.
215 Fleming et al., supra note 77; Fleming & Frenken, supra note 8.
216 Fleming et al., supra note 77, at 539 (“Silicon Valley aggregated before Boston
because Stanford graduates took employment at IBM’s Almaden Valley Labs and because
IBM sponsored a postdoctoral program that seeded the Valley with IBM patent
coauthors.”).
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Powell, Packalen & Whittington, supra note 8, at 449; see also GLOBAL CONNECT,
BIOTECHNOLOGY CLUSTER PROJECT: SAN DIEGO ANALYSIS 13–15 (2010).
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norm that is out of sync with the background social norms of innovators in
the innovation clusters described in Section I.C. By enjoining employees
from using know-how acquired during their employment in competing firms
because, as one court put it, employees, even those acting in good faith, will
inevitably rely on information “held in [their] head[s],” the inevitable disclosure doctrine acts as a judicially created covenant not to compete, but without the safeguards of a negotiated, contractual arrangement between an
employer and an employee.220 Courts that apply the inevitable disclosure
doctrine have, for example, banned employees from starting employment
with a new employer for several months, and for working on particular
projects for years—despite lacking evidence of actual misappropriation.221
There is, however, wide variation in how states that recognize the inevitable disclosure doctrine apply it to particular cases.222 One important variation for the purpose of this Article concerns the importance of a finding of
“bad faith” on the part of a departing employee. For example, in the leading
“inevitable disclosure” case, PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond,223 the Seventh Circuit,
applying Illinois state law, enjoined a PepsiCo employee from “assuming any
duties with Quaker relating to beverage pricing, marketing, and distribution,”224 based in part on the employee’s “lack of forthrightness on some
occasions, and out and out lies on others” to his colleagues at PepsiCo.225
The court in PepsiCo emphasized the importance of a showing of “bad faith”
to make an inevitable disclosure claim. Under PepsiCo, a departing
employee’s bad faith serves as key evidence of his or her intent to reveal trade
secrets in his or her new employment. Yet, other courts have issued injunctions under an inevitable disclosure theory even upon finding that the former employee had acted in good faith. For example, in Merck & Co. v.
Lyon,226 the court explained: “when . . . the possibility of disclosure [is] high
and the value to the competitor great, an injunction would issue even when
there had been no bad faith or underhanded dealing by the former
employee or the competitor.”227
To foster the emergence of knowledge networks, the inevitable disclosure doctrine should be narrowed in two ways. First, it should be limited to
cases in which opportunistic behavior or “bad faith” on the part of employees
can be documented. In cases of opportunistic behavior, where the employee
secretly absconds with work done by others at the employing firm, it is
exceedingly unlikely that employee migration will generate the kind of reser220 Barilla Am., Inc. v. Wright, No. 4-02-CV-90267, 2002 WL 31165069, at *9–10 (S.D.
Iowa July 5, 2002).
221 See Rowe, supra note 184.
222 Id. (summarizing state variation in the application of the inevitable disclosure
doctrine).
223 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995).
224 Id. at 1263.
225 Id. at 1270 (quoting PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, No. 94 C 6838, 1996 WL 3965, at
*33 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
226 941 F. Supp. 1443 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
227 Id. at 1460.
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voir of trust that leads to the formation of inter-firm networks. In other
words, “bad faith” is not only an indicator of the likelihood a former
employee would reveal trade secrets in his or her new job, but also an indicator that a particular employee migration would not be trust-enhancing. In
contrast, when “bad faith” is absent, the inevitable disclosure doctrine chills
employee mobility when it would be most profitable for network formation,
i.e., when it would create a reservoir of trust among employees across firms
that would facilitate reciprocal information exchange.
Second, the inevitable disclosure doctrine is particularly pernicious to
cluster formation when it prevents employees from revealing, and using, negative technical know-how and troubleshooting insights for experimental protocols that they have acquired through their previous employment.
Technical know-how and troubleshooting insights for experimental protocols
are two pieces of information that are shared often across epistemic networks
of scientists.228 Advances in complicated technological frontiers are simplified enormously if all involved share information on false starts and blind
alleys, and on specific “tricks” for getting a public protocol to work, so that
experimental failures need not be repeated. And because negative knowhow and technical troubleshooting insights are almost never distributed in
printed format, word-of-mouth diffusion is the only way to hear about these
false starts (other than having to make those mistakes oneself).229 In addition, as others have argued, depriving innovators of their ability to change
jobs simply because they may “subconsciously” reveal negative know-how
acquired through previous employment, or worse, forcing them to repeat
errors in new employment—lest they rely on trade secret negative knowledge—is impractical, likely inefficient for overall innovation, and injurious to
employee motivation.230 The inefficiencies associated with applying the inevitable disclosure doctrine to negative know-how are magnified in industries
where clusters are found to be beneficial: high-technology, fast moving, complex industries with a background epistemic network motivated to advance a
particular technological frontier.
Finally, changing trade secret law’s background assumptions regarding
the scope of an employee’s general background knowledge and skills,
employer-employee duty of loyalty and confidence, and the inevitable disclosure doctrine, curtail the reach of trade secrets, but still leave contracts as a
viable, alternative option for employers. As I argued in Part II, a penalty
default trade secret regime that forces firms to contract around and reveal
their information-sharing preferences to future employees is likely efficiencyenhancing. Indeed, covenants not to compete are a contractual strategy that
can increase the reach of trade secret law by providing restrictions on an
employee’s choices for future employment. In most states, courts will
enforce covenants not to compete, so long as they are “reasonable,” i.e., lim228 See, e.g., BIOFORUM, http://www.protocol-online.org/forums/ (last visited Jan. 19,
2017).
229 See, e.g., Schooler, supra note 205.
230 See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 27, at 624; Lobel, supra note 27, at 839–42.
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ited in time, place, and scope.231 California is the exception to this rule.
Pursuant to California Business and Professions Code section 16600, “every
contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession,
trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void.”232 California will, however, enforce covenants not to compete that are narrowly tailored to protect
only the disclosure of trade secrets.233
The analysis developed in Part II can provide guidelines for interpreting
what constitutes a “reasonable” restriction on competition, and for identifying circumstances in which covenants not to compete should be presumed
unenforceable. First, in high-technology industries, where innovation is fastmoving and there is an underlying epistemic community (often tethered to a
university) that favors open communication, there is a strong argument for a
presumption against covenants not to compete that go beyond the narrow
tailoring adopted in California. Second, reasonableness should be interpreted in light of background innovation-enhancing social norms of innovators in these clusters. This means that, even those covenants that are
narrowly tailored to protect trade secrets should not encompass negative
know-how and knowledge about how to successfully perform publicly available protocols—the type of information that is most often reciprocally shared
among innovation clusters. Of course, courts could reach the same conclusion simply by narrowing the scope of what constitutes a trade secret in the
first place, as I argue in subsection III.A.1.
B.

State Experimentalism vs. Federal Uniformity

This final section is necessarily brief. It is not intended to be a comprehensive exploration of the tension between state and federal jurisdiction in
trade secret law. Rather, it is meant to set the stage to begin exploring how
the importance of local, informal informational exchanges in complex industries may inform the balance between state and federal trade secret law.
State trade secret law remains heterogeneous, despite most states having
adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).234 Specifically, states have
taken different approaches to the doctrines I have engaged with above: the
types of information that qualify as a trade secret, the scope of employees’
duty of loyalty, the viability of inevitable disclosure theories, and the enforceability of covenants not to compete.
For example, in New York (one of the few states that has not adopted
the UTSA) technical negative know-how arguably does not qualify as a trade
secret but constitutes part of an employee’s background “technical knowl231 See Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 114.
232 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2016).
233 Jeffrey S. Klein et al., The Trade Secrets Exception to California’s Ban on Employee Noncompetition and Nonsolicitation Agreements After Edwards v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, WEIL (Dec. 6,
2013), http://www.weil.com/articles/the-trade-secrets-exception-to-californias-ban-on-em
ployee-noncompetition2_12-06-2013.
234 See David S. Almeling, Four Reasons to Enact a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 19 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 769, 772–75 (2009).
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edge.”235 In contrast, California appears to protect negative information as
trade secrets.236 And Utah has been explicit in its choice to protect both
positive and negative technical information.237 The scope of an employee’s
duty of loyalty also varies by jurisdiction.238 Recent decisions in California
have construed the duty narrowly, emphasizing that a broad duty of loyalty
would ignore the “consistent safeguards upon employee mobility and the
freedom to work in the state of California.”239 Similarly, in Massachusetts the
duty of loyalty applies only to some (high-ranking) employees.240 In contrast, New York recognizes a stronger common law duty of loyalty for all
employees at all times prior to termination of employment.241 The applicability of the inevitable disclosure doctrine also varies by state. California has
refused to recognize the doctrine as inimical to state public policy in favor of
employee mobility.242 Colorado243 and Maryland244 have taken the same
approach. Other states, such as Illinois, Connecticut, and Delaware, however, have applied the doctrine on multiple occasions.245 Finally, a handful
of states (California, Colorado, Hawaii, Montana, North Dakota, and
Oklahoma) have held covenants not to compete generally unenforceable,
even if reasonable in purpose and scope, with some specific exceptions.246
Commentators have generally viewed these discrepancies with suspicion
and argued for greater uniformity in trade secret law.247 State variation is
235 See, e.g., EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 305, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); see
also discussion supra subsection III.A.1.
236 See Cinebase Software, Inc. v. Media Guar. Tr., Inc., No. C98-1100, 1998 WL 661465,
at *12 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 1998) (“‘Negative research’ can be protectable as a trade
secret.”).
237 See, e.g., Novell, Inc. v. Timpanogos Research Grp., Inc., 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1197,
1216–17 (Utah Dist. Ct. 1998).
238 See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., No. CV 04-9049, 2011 WL 8427611 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 28, 2011).
239 Id. at *2.
240 See, e.g., Robinson v. Watts Detective Agency, Inc., 685 F.2d 729, 736 (1st Cir. 1982);
Sterling Research, Inc. v. Pietrobono, No. 02-40150, 2005 WL 3116758, at *10 (D. Mass.
Nov. 21, 2005); Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255 (Mass. 1989) (partners).
241 See, e.g., Am. Fed. Grp., Ltd. v. Rothenberg, 136 F.3d 897, 905 (2d Cir. 1998).
242 Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1119–20 (N.D. Cal.
1999).
243 Saturn Sys., Inc. v. Militare, 252 P.3d 516, 526 (Colo. App. 2011).
244 LeJeune v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 849 A.2d 451, 471 (Md. 2004).
245 See, e.g., CTRE, LLC v. Colburn, No. CV074028031, 2008 WL 2796870, at *8 (Conn.
Super. Ct. June 20, 2008); W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Wu, No. Civ.A. 263-N, 2006 WL 2692584,
at *17 (Del. Ch. 2006); Strata Mktg., Inc. v. Murphy, 740 N.E.2d 1166, 1178 (Ill. App. Ct.
2000).
246 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600-16602.5 (West 2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113
(2016); HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-4 (2016); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 28-2-703 to -705 (2016); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2016); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 217-219a (2016).
247 See Marina Lao, Federalizing Trade Secrets Law in an Information Economy, 59 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1633(1998); James Pooley, The Myth of the Trade Secret Troll: Why the Defend Trade Secrets
Act Improves the Protection of Commercial Information, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1045, 1047
(2016) (“[F]ederalizing civil trade secret law fills a critical gap in effective enforcement of
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thought to dampen innovation by creating uncertainty regarding applicable
state law, leading to “increased inefficiency and costs associated with investigating and complying with different states’ requirements [for achieving trade
secret protection], and ultimately less investment in innovation.”248 More
recently, however, and in the wake of congressional initiatives to create a
federal cause of action for trade secret protection, academic commentators
have often opposed the federalization of trade secret law on a variety of
grounds.249
The Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) is the culmination of several congressional initiatives to federalize (and thus harmonize) state trade secret
law.250 The DTSA enacts a private, federal cause of action for trade secret
misappropriation, based on congressional power under the Commerce
Clause.251 The DTSA does not preempt state trade secret law;252 nevertheless, and depending on the interpretation of key DTSA provisions, it will have
a direct impact on the ability of states to experiment effectively with different
levels of local trade secret protection.253 First, although the DTSA adopts a
private rights against cross-border misappropriation that has become too stealthy and
quick to be dealt with predictably in state courts. The DTSA accomplishes this by effecting
only very modest changes, relying heavily on existing laws and rules.”); Alissa Cardillo,
Note, Another Bite at the Apple for Trade Secret Protection: Why Stronger Federal Laws Are Needed to
Protect a Corporation’s Most Valuable Property, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 577, 603
(2016) (arguing that the federal courts provide a superior forum for trade secret litigation
because they are “better suited to deal with diverse parties from different states or
countries”).
248 Rebecca Filipovic, Will Trade Secrecy Finally Join Its IP Siblings, Patents Trademarks and
Copyright, in Federal Court?, MCKEON, SHELDON, MEHLING, LLC (Feb. 10, 2015), http://
msmhawaii.com/2015/02/will-trade-secrecy-finally-join-its-ip-siblings-patents-trademarksand-copyright-in-federal-court/.
249 See, e.g., Stephen Anderson, The Defend Trade Secret Act: Arrival of the Trade Secret
Trolls?, 2015 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 1; Stephen Y. Chow, DTSA: A Federal Tort of
Unfair Competition in Aerial Reconnaissance, Broken Deals, and Employment, 72 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. ONLINE 341, 344 (2016); Eric Goldman, Ex Parte Seizures and the Defend Trade Secrets Act,
72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 284 (2015); David S. Levine & Sharon K. Sandeen, Here
Come the Trade Secret Trolls, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 230 (2015); Sharon K. Sandeen,
The DTSA: The Litigator’s Full Employment Act, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 308 (2015);
Christopher B. Seaman, The Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101 VA. L. REV. 317
(2015); Professors’ Letter in Opposition to the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015 (Nov. 17,
2015), https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/blogs/2015%20Professors%20Letter%20in%
20Opposition%20to%20DTSA%20FINAL.pdf [hereinafter Letter].
250 See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
251 “An owner of a trade secret that is misappropriated may bring a civil action under
this subsection if the trade secret is related to a product or service used in, or intended for
use in, interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(1) (West 2016).
252 “Except as provided in section 1833(b), this chapter shall not be construed to preempt or displace any other remedies . . . provided by . . . State . . . law for the misappropriation of a trade secret.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 1838.
253 See, e.g., Levine & Sandeen, supra note 249 (arguing that the DTSA is overly skewed
towards trade secret holders, betraying a conception of trade secrets as strong “property”
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definition of trade secret that is largely co-extensive with the UTSA, significant interpretive ambiguities remain.254 It is unclear, for example, whether
the DTSA allows the protection of negative know-how,255 and what types of
information fall under the rubric of trade secrets.256 The availability of an
alternative cause of action with a broader scope of protection than that available in some states (for example, protection for negative technical knowhow) will necessarily ratchet up overall trade secret protection in any state,
making it all but impossible for any individual state to effectively set a lower
scope of protection. Second, it is unclear how courts will interpret the scope
of an employee’s duty of loyalty under the DTSA, since this term is not explicitly defined in the statute. As Sharon Sandeen and Christopher Seaman
argue, “without any statutory definition or associated commentary (as exists
in the case of the UTSA), it is unclear whether federal courts can (and
should) interpret those terms anew or apply the meaning of those terms as
developed under state law.”257 A new, federal interpretation of the scope of
rights but failing to appreciate the equal importance of employee mobility and information diffusion for sound trade secret law and policy); Sandeen, supra note 249, at 313,
319–20 (arguing that the DTSA will result in “a large percentage of all cases currently filed
in state courts [being] filed in federal courts,” and in “attorneys for both plaintiffs and
defendants . . . argu[ing] for the creation of federal trade secret principles over established
state law principles when it suits their client’s interests”); Seaman, supra note 249, at
365–68 (arguing that federalizing trade secret law will prevent states from experimenting
with “what amount of legal protection is most likely to foster innovation and promote
economic growth”). But see Pooley, supra note 247, at 1047 (“Having no preemptive effect,
the federal law leaves in place all relevant state laws and policies, allowing federal courts to
address issues of concurrent jurisdiction as they have in other areas of the law.”).
254 See, e.g., Sharon K. Sandeen & Christopher B. Seaman, Toward a Federal Jurisprudence
of Trade Secret Law (2017) (on file with author) (making this argument). Additionally, two
key states for the complex industries described in this Article, Massachusetts and New York,
have not adopted the UTSA.
255 There is a persuasive argument that the DTSA does not protect negative know-how,
because this type of information is not “related to” a product or service, as required under
the Commerce Clause. From the perspective of knowledge networks advanced in this Article, this interpretation is innovation-enhancing, as it would allow tailoring by leaving the
decision of whether to protect negative know-how to individual states. See 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1836 (b)(1) (“An owner of a trade secret that is misappropriated may bring a civil action
under this subsection if the trade secret is related to a product or service used in, or
intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce.”); see also Sandeen & Seaman, supra
note 254.
256 See, e.g., Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 254. Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839(3)
(DTSA’s definition of “trade secret,” one that includes “all forms and types of financial,
business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including patterns,
plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques,
processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or
how stored, compiled, or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing”), with CAL. CIV. § 3426.1(d) (West 2016) (UTSA’s definition which is
limited to “formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process”). See also Letter, supra note 249, at 7.
257 Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 254.
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the duty of loyalty may provide uniformity at the expense of useful state variation. Finally, the DTSA has a controversial remedies provision that allows for
the ex parte seizure of “property necessary to prevent the propagation or
dissemination of the trade secret that is the subject of the action.”258 This
type of provision does not exist under state law, providing claimants under
the DTSA with a powerful weapon against potential trade secret disclosure.
Ex ante, this provision is the type of strong trade secret norm that can have a
chilling effect on the socially beneficial practices of open-sharing described
in Part I. On the other hand, the DTSA explicitly preserves the ability of
states to refuse to enforce covenants not to compete.259 The DTSA also
appears to reject the inevitable disclosure doctrine by requiring that injunctions be based “on evidence of threatened misappropriation and not merely
on the information the person knows.”260 These two provisions—which were
missing in early drafts of the DTSA—are likely to be innovation-enhancing
because they enable individual states to continue tailoring these two doctrines to their particular local industry profiles.
The most important lesson from research on innovation networks, however, is that it is hard to design a one-size-fits-all trade secret doctrine. Networks of information-sharing emerge as an important factor for a specific subset
of industries—those that involve complex knowledge, new, fast developing
technologies, and cross-cutting epistemic networks (often linked to a university, which serves as an anchor tenant).261 In this subset of industries, fostering local information exchange appears to be crucial for the success of
clusters. Further, industries of particular types often locate at geographic
“centers.”262 Taken together, these two factors suggest that tailoring can
additionally take place through state-by-state variation of trade secret law to
fit local industry profiles. Because research on innovation clusters is still nas258 Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, § 2(b)(2)(A)(i), 130 Stat.
376, 376 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); see also, e.g., Goldman,
supra note 249 (criticizing the ex parte seizure provision); Levine & Sandeen, supra note
249, at 255 (arguing that the ex parte seizure provision could cause a “profound” “chilling
effect on innovation and job growth”); Letter, supra note 249, at 3 (arguing the ex parte
seizure provision “contains significant potential to cause anti-competitive harm, particularly against U.S.-based small businesses, startups and other entrepreneurs”).
259 A court may not grant an injunction that: “(I) prevent[s] a person from entering
into an employment relationship, and that conditions placed on such employment shall be
based on evidence of threatened misappropriation and not merely on the information the
person knows” or “(II) otherwise conflict[s] with an applicable State law prohibiting
restraints on the practice of a lawful profession, trade, or business.” 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1836(b)(3)(A).
260 Id.
261 See Gilson, supra note 27, at 627–28 (“However, this balance may well be quite local,
depending on the characteristics of particular industries. And because industries are not
randomly distributed across jurisdictions, each state’s particular industrial population may
dictate a different balance.”).
262 For example, Boston, San Diego, and Silicon Valley have a high density of biotechnology and IT companies.
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cent, it also supports the wisdom of allowing states to experiment with different levels of trade secret protection to fit the profiles of local industries.263
CONCLUSION
This Article has described a crucial aspect of successful innovation in
complex technological fields264 that share a background epistemic community: the transmission of know-how through informal, local networks of innovators that cut across firm boundaries. The centrality of informal knowledge
networks for innovation in a subset of technological fields has important
implications for two key questions in trade secret law. First, which types of
technical information should qualify as a trade secret and which as knowledge belonging to innovators themselves? Second, how should we balance
state trade secret protection with the newly created federal cause of action
under the Defend Trade Secrets Act? I have argued that in these technological fields the scope of trade secret protection should be construed narrowly—to exclude the kinds of information that are most frequently
exchanged through informal knowledge networks: negative know-how and
details regarding how to carry out publicly available protocols. Further, the
need to tailor trade secret protection to different technological environments highlights the desirability of state experimentation with different levels
of protection. A federal cause of action that provides uniformly strong levels
of trade secret protection, however, will invariably ratchet up protection everywhere, interfering with states’ abilities to design tailored trade secret
regimes. Preserving a space for state experimentation, therefore, will also
require a narrow interpretation of the scope of trade secret protection under
the DTSA.
Knowledge networks can be fragile. Their stability depends in part on
the interplay between the strength of trade secret protection and the clashing norms and interests of two groups within innovation firms—managers
and inventors. As this Article shows, managers are generally hostile to informal information trading across firm boundaries, even when it is reciprocal
and likely to advance overall innovation within a technological cluster.
263 See Camilla Alexandra Hrdy, Patent Nationally, Innovate Locally, 31 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. (forthcoming 2017). Hrdy has reached a similar conclusion using a different theoretical framework. Hrdy argues that, both under “market preserving” federalism and clustering theories, the power to design trade secret law should be given primarily to states. See
id. Under market-preserving principles, states are likely to have “better incentives and better information to design trade secret laws that match the needs of specific industries and
people within their jurisdictions.” Id. In turn, “Tiebout clustering” theories suggest that
state variation will “lead[ ] to more efficient matching of firms to different jurisdictions
and more efficient production within those jurisdictions and overall.” Id. Note that Tiebout clustering theories are different from the geographic clustering described in this Article. In brief, Tiebout clustering argues for state differentiation on the basis that people
tend to cluster to distinct geographic communities based on their shared preferences. Id.
264 Complex technological fields are those where technological progress is rapid and
knowledge is widely dispersed among firms.
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Inventors in these technological areas, on the other hand, are part of epistemic communities with norms of open sharing, who often have personal interests in advancing particular technological frontiers. For these reasons, they
are more likely to form networks of informal information trading. In the
words of an inventor from the Boston biotechnology cluster, “management
thought we had all these great secrets to conceal; the engineers knew that the
value was in collaboration.”265
Knowledge network formation and stability is also mediated by local
employee migration. In addition to facilitating spillovers across firms, inventor migration generates local social connections—and a reservoir of trust—
that span firm boundaries. In turn, it is this reservoir of trust that facilitates
informal and reciprocal informational exchanges across firm boundaries.
Of course, trade secret law is only one piece in a complex system that
influences the pace and content of innovation. Modifying the strength of
one piece in this system (here, trade secret law) will invariably change how
firms use two other available pieces: contracts and patent law. Narrowing
trade secret protection may push employers to contract for enhanced
secrecy. Yet, this situation is still preferable to strong default trade secret
protection in these industries. Contracts entail negotiation and shared
agreement. When managers’ expectations differ widely from those of innovator communities—as was the case in the innovation clusters surveyed
here—contract negotiation will prompt a confrontation between background open-sharing norms and express expectations of secrecy. The outcome of such confrontation depends in part on the strength of the
background norms of the epistemic inventor community.
What, then, about patents? The two types of information most commonly exchanged in informal networks (negative know-how and information
about publicly available research protocols) are unlikely candidates for patent protection.266 And even if narrowing the scope of trade secret protection would lead firms to prefer patent law broadly, this is an overall desirable
outcome.267 Trade secrets and patent law differ in one crucial respect.
Trade secrets prevent conversations about research plans, research protocols,
and research results. Patents, on the other hand, enable such conversations.
By granting inventors a property right in their innovation while simultaneously encouraging public disclosure of how to make and use it, patents do
not shut down informational exchange about the innovation but simply pre-

265 Fleming et al., supra note 77, at 539.
266 See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 120, at 194–98 (analyzing trade secret protection for
unpatentable innovations and industrial know-how in particular).
267 See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Secrecy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1769 (2016)
(analyzing the interplay between patents and trade secrets, and arguing for regulatorenforced disclosure in areas, such as drug-development, that are regulated by an administrative agency).
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vent non-patentees from making and using the innovation without
permission.268
Research on informal information exchanges across firm boundaries is
still nascent. While studies suggest that what is exchanged across boundaries
is incremental know-how, additional research is needed to fully catalogue the
types of information that are exchanged informally. Our understanding of
the extent of informal information-sharing in different technological regimes
also remains incomplete. Although this Article has highlighted the rise of
social norms of reciprocity in innovation communities that are anchored to a
university, case studies also show that reciprocal know-how trading can happen in other contexts. More research is needed to understand both the
breadth of informal know-how trading and how social norms that enable
reciprocal sharing emerge, are maintained, and are policed. In turn, a fuller
understanding of informational exchange practices across firm boundaries
will enable a more contextually sensitive design of innovation policies.

268 This is a highly stylized, “optimistic” or “idealized” view of patent law. In practice,
patentees may also seek to shut down conversations about their inventions, and in particular refuse to share details about experimental protocols described in the patent disclosure.
See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Expired Patents, Trade Secrets, and Stymied Competition, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV 1611 (2017). Nevertheless, these are failures of the patent system to
achieve its stated and desired goals of teaching and disclosure. These goals contrast with
the core purpose of trade secret law, which is to aid firms (and individuals) in keeping
commercially valuable information secret.

